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The prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation has 
long been considered sacrosanct. It traces its legal roots to the Nuremberg 
trials although the ethical foundations dig much deeper. It prohibits all 
forms of medical and scientific experimentation on non-consenting 
individuals. The prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation 
is now well established in both national and international law. 
Despite its status as a fundamental and non-derogable norm, the 
prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation was called into 
question during the War on Terror by the CIA’s treatment of “high-value 
detainees.” Seeking to acquire actionable intelligence, the CIA tested the 
“theory of learned helplessness” on these detainees by subjecting them to a 
series of enhanced interrogation techniques.  
This Article revisits the prohibition against non-consensual human 
experimentation to determine whether the CIA’s treatment of detainees 
violated international law. It examines the historical record that gave rise to 
the prohibition and its eventual codification in international law. It then 
considers the application of this norm to the CIA’s treatment of high-value 
detainees by examining Salim v. Mitchell, a lawsuit brought by detainees 
who were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. This Article 
concludes that the CIA breached the prohibition against non-consensual 
human experimentation when it conducted systematic studies on these 
detainees to validate the theory of learned helplessness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 killed thousands of innocent people. 
In response, the United States began military operations in Afghanistan and 
counter-terrorism operations throughout the world. The attacks and the 
subsequent response eventually created a counter-terrorism regime that still 
exists seventeen years later, and one that will likely continue for decades.1 
This counter-terrorism regime opened previously-closed debates on human 
rights.2 It contested the role of civil liberties in democratic societies. It raised 
questions about the proper treatment of detainees. It challenged basic 
assumptions about the prohibitions against torture and other cruel, inhuman, 
 
 1.  See generally ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME 
EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON (2016); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY 
OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008). 
 2.  See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (2008); LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIMES OF CONFLICT AND TERRORISM 
(2011); HELEN DUFFY, THE “WAR ON TERROR” AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 
2015); LESSONS AND LEGACIES OF THE WAR ON TERROR: FROM MORAL PANIC TO PERMANENT WAR 
(Gershon Shafir et al. eds., 2012); RIGHTS VS. PUBLIC SAFETY AFTER 9/11: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF 
TERRORISM (Amitai Etzioni & Jason H. Marsh eds., 2003); JAMES RISEN, PAY ANY PRICE: GREED, 
POWER, AND ENDLESS WAR (2014).  
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or degrading treatment. And it caused the United States to revisit the 
prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation.3 
The prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation has 
long been considered sacrosanct.4 It traces its legal roots to the Nuremberg 
trials, although the ethical foundations dig much deeper. It prohibits all forms 
of medical and scientific experimentation on human beings without informed 
consent. The prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation is 
now well-established under national and international law.5 Indeed, its status 
as a customary norm of international law is evidenced in an overwhelming 
number of sources.6 
 
 3.  Non-consensual human experimentation during the War on Terror has been subject to extensive 
analysis by the medical profession. See, e.g., SARAH DOUGHERTY, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
NUREMBERG BETRAYED: HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM (Claudia Rader 
ed., 2017); DAVID H. HOFFMAN ET AL., SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, REPORT TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION: INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
RELATING TO APA ETHICS GUIDELINES, NATIONAL SECURITY INTERROGATIONS, AND TORTURE (2015); 
STEPHEN SOLDZ ET AL., ALL THE PRESIDENT’S PSYCHOLOGISTS: THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION’S SECRET COMPLICITY WITH THE WHITE HOUSE AND US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN 
SUPPORT OF THE CIA’S “ENHANCED” INTERROGATION PROGRAM (2015). Non-consensual human 
experimentation has also been examined by the legal profession. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, 
Interrogation Medicine?, in LAW AND GLOBAL HEALTH: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 354 (Michael Freeman 
et al. eds., 2014); M. Gregg Bloche, Toward a Science of Torture?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2017); David 
Brennan, Torture of Guantánamo Detainees with the Complicity of Medical Health Personnel: The Case 
for Accountability and Providing a Forum for Redress for These International Wrongs, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 
1005 (2011); Jeffrey S. Kaye, Isolation, Sensory Deprivation, and Sensory Overload: History, Research, 
and Interrogation Policy, from the 1950s to the Present Day, 66 GUILD PRAC. 2 (2009); Jonathan H. 
Marks, Doctors as Pawns? Law and Medical Ethics at Guantanamo Bay, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 711 
(2007); Eric Merriam, Legal But Unethical: Interrogation and Military Health Professionals, 11 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 123 (2014); STEVEN H. MILES, OATH BETRAYED: TORTURE, MEDICAL COMPLICITY, 
AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2006); James Risen, Report Finds Collaboration over Torture, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 1, 2015, at A1.  
 4.  See generally REBECCA DRESSER, SILENT PARTNERS: HUMAN SUBJECTS AND RESEARCH 
ETHICS (2016); ROBERT L. KLITZMAN, THE ETHICS POLICE? THE STRUGGLE TO MAKE HUMAN 
RESEARCH SAFE (2015); VICKI ORANSKY WITTENSTEIN, FOR THE GOOD OF MANKIND?: THE SHAMEFUL 
HISTORY OF HUMAN MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION (2013); RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A 
HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986). 
 5.  See infra Part II.   
 6.  Scholars have addressed various aspects of human experimentation in the context of 
international law. See, e.g., Sara Louise Dominey, Ebola, Experimental Medicine, Economics, and 
Ethics: An Evaluation of International Disease Outbreak Law, 44 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 133 (2015); 
Kristen Farrell, Human Experimentation in Developing Countries: Improving International Practices by 
Identifying Vulnerable Populations and Allocating Fair Benefits, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 136 
(2006); Kevin M. King, A Proposal for the Effective International Regulation of Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 163 (1998); Adam H. Laughton, Somewhere to Run, 
Somewhere to Hide?: International Regulation of Human Subject Experimentation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 181 (2007); John Lunstroph, Regulating the Research Enterprise: International Norms and the 
Right to Bodily Integrity in Human Experiment Litigation, 23 ISSUES L. & MED. 141 (2007); Benjamin 
Mason Meier, International Criminal Prosecution of Physicians: A Critique of Professors Annas and 
Grodin’s Proposed International Medical Tribunal, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 419 (2004); Benjamin Mason 
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Despite its status as a fundamental and non-derogable norm, the 
prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation was called into 
question during the War on Terror by the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(CIA) treatment of “high-value detainees” held in its Rendition, Detention, 
and Interrogation Program (RDI Program).7 Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the 
CIA determined it needed to develop an interrogation program for captured 
Al-Qaeda operatives.8 Two psychologists working with the CIA proposed 
testing the theory of learned helplessness on high-value detainees. The 
theory of learned helplessness posits that individuals who are conditioned to 
be passive and depressed in response to adverse treatment will be more likely 
to cooperate with interrogators.9 If properly executed, the CIA believed the 
theory could be used in the RDI Program to promote cooperation by 
detainees. Working with the two psychologists, the CIA developed a set of 
“enhanced interrogation techniques” that were then used to test the theory on 
detainees.10 In the CIA’s study, the detainees’ degree of cooperation 
represented the study’s dependent variable, and each interrogation technique 
served as a distinct independent variable.11 
The CIA began testing the theory on Abu Zubaydah, an alleged high-
ranking Al-Qaeda operative, who was captured in Pakistan on March 28, 
2002.12 Zubaydah was subjected to several enhanced interrogation 
techniques, including waterboarding, stress positions, wall standing, and 
sleep deprivation.13 Each interrogation session was carefully designed, 
executed, recorded, and studied. The CIA continued testing the theory on 
 
Meier, International Protection of Persons Undergoing Medical Experimentation: Protecting the Right 
of Informed Consent, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 513 (2002). 
 7.  See infra Part III. The RDI Program was established after 9/11 to capture and detain suspected 
terrorists. 
 8. See JOHN RIZZO, COMPANY MAN: THIRTY YEARS OF CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS IN THE CIA 
181–202 (2014); JOSE A. RODRIGUEZ, JR., HARD MEASURES: HOW AGGRESSIVE CIA ACTION AFTER 
9/11 SAVED AMERICAN LIVES (2013); GEORGE TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: THE CIA DURING 
AMERICA’S TIME OF CRISIS (2008); see S. REP. NO. 113-288, at 11 (2014) [hereinafter SSCI REPORT]. 
 9.  See Maria Konnikova, Trying to Cure Depression, But Inspiring Torture, THE NEW YORKER, 
Jan. 14, 2015; Jane Mayer, The Experiment, THE NEW YORKER, July 11, 2005; Martin Seligman & 
Tamsin Shaw, “Learned Helplessness” & Torture: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Apr. 21, 2016, 
at 60; Tamsin Shaw, The Psychologists Take Power, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2016, at 38. The 
seminal work on the theory of learned helplessness was performed by Martin Seligman. See Lyn Y. 
Abramson & Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Reformulation, 87 J. 
AB. PSYCH. 49, 49–70 (1978); Martin E. Seligman & Steven Maier, Failure to Escape Traumatic Shock, 
74 J. EXPER. PSYCH. 1, 1–9 (1967).  
 10.  SSCI REPORT, supra note 8, at 21, 32–34. 
 11.  See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY 77, 107–09 (1994) (describing the 
distinction between dependent and independent variables). 
 12.  SSCI REPORT, supra note 8, at 46. The CIA subsequently determined Zubaydah was not a 
member of Al Qaeda. Id. at 410. 
 13.  Id. at 40–46. 
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dozens of other high-value detainees, with further adjustments made as a 
result of extensive observations by medical and psychological personnel.14 
This Article revisits the prohibition against non-consensual human 
experimentation and considers its applicability to the CIA’s treatment of 
detainees.15 Part II examines the development of the prohibition against non-
consensual human experimentation. It begins with a review of the 
Nuremberg trials and examines subsequent efforts to codify the norm in 
international law. Based on this historical record, it then offers a clear 
definition of the prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation. 
Part III of this Article reviews the development and implementation of the 
CIA’s RDI Program and the application of the theory of learned helplessness 
on detainees. While dozens of detainees were subjected to enhanced 
interrogation techniques, this section focuses on the CIA’s treatment of Abu 
Zubaydah. Part IV then examines the groundbreaking case of Salim v. 
Mitchell, which involved a civil lawsuit filed against the two psychologists 
who developed the CIA interrogation program. Finally, Part V critically 
examines the RDI Program and its use of enhanced interrogation techniques 
to determine whether the CIA violated the prohibition against non-
consensual human experimentation. Briefly stated, it did.16 
II. REVISITING THE HISTORICAL RECORD 
Human experimentation has existed for centuries.17 And yet, formal 
standards requiring the informed consent of human subjects were neither 
 
 14.  One of the two psychologists who developed and helped implement the enhanced interrogation 
techniques subsequently wrote a detailed account of his experiences. JAMES E. MITCHELL & BILL 
HARLOW, ENHANCED INTERROGATION: INSIDE THE MINDS AND MOTIVES OF THE ISLAMIC TERRORISTS 
TRYING TO DESTROY AMERICA (2016). A preliminary draft of the book identified James Mitchell as the 
“architect of the CIA interrogation program.” In fact, a high-ranking CIA official acknowledged that 
Mitchell was “the architect of the CIA interrogation program.” Rodriguez Dep. 53, March 7, 2017, Salim 
v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ). 
 15.  Non-consensual human experimentation can also be classified as a discrete form of torture or 
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. It can also be designated as a war crime or crime against 
humanity. This Article examines the prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation and its 
consideration as a distinct violation of international law. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni et al., An 
Appraisal of Human Experimentation in International Law and Practice: The Need for International 
Regulation of Human Experimentation, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1597 (1981). 
 16.  The CIA has denied this allegation. According to an agency spokesperson, “[t]he C.I.A. did 
not, as part of its past detention program, conduct human subject research on any detainee or group of 
detainees. The entire detention effort has been the subject of multiple, comprehensive reviews within our 
government, including by the Department of Justice.” James Risen, Medical Ethics Lapses Cited in 
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2010, at A6. 
 17.  See generally ANDREW GOLISZEK, IN THE NAME OF SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF SECRET 
PROGRAMS, MEDICAL RESEARCH, AND HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION xi-xii (2003); SUSAN LEDERER, 
SUBJECTED TO SCIENCE: HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN AMERICA BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
(1995); Jay Katz, Human Sacrifice and Human Experimentation: Reflections at Nuremberg, 22 YALE J. 
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required nor even common. Experiments were routinely performed on 
individuals who were unaware they were human subjects. While the ethical 
norms of the medical profession counseled physicians to “do no harm,” these 
norms often failed to prevent harmful experiments on human subjects.18 In 
fact, the norm against non-consensual human experimentation was not 
formally recognized by the international community until after the Second 
World War.19 The historical record makes clear the norm developed in 
response to the medical and scientific experiments conducted by Nazi 
Germany. 
A. The Nuremberg Trials 
During the Second World War, German doctors and scientists 
conducted medical and scientific experiments on prisoners of war and other 
detainees.20 These experiments were most often performed in concentration 
and extermination camps, including Auschwitz and Dachau, and were meant 
to aid the German war effort.21 Some tests sought to improve medical care 
by trying new techniques on detainees. Other tests sought new treatment 
options for diseases. Thousands of individuals, including children, were 
subjected to horrific experiments. Along with the systematic extermination 
of Jews, gypsies, persons with disabilities, and other perceived 
“undesirables,” the human experimentation performed by the Nazi regime 
during the Second World War represents one of the darkest moments in 
human history. 
Human experimentation was first addressed by the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT), which was convened to prosecute 
twenty-two leading Nazi military and political leaders. The IMT Charter 
listed three principal crimes: crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes 
 
INT’L L. 401 (1997); Jochen Vollmann & Rolf Winau, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation 
Before the Nuremberg Code, 313 BR. MED. J. 1445 (1996). 
 18.  See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 338–44 (2d ed. 1999); SHEILA A.M. MCLEAN, FIRST DO NO HARM: LAW, ETHICS AND 
HEALTH CARE (2006); Matthew Walter, First, Do Harm, 482 NATURE 148 (2012). 
 19.  See SIR NIGEL RODLEY & MATT POLLARD, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 412–15 (3d ed. 2009); SHELDON RUBENFELD & SUSAN BENEDICT, HUMAN 
SUBJECTS RESEARCH AFTER THE HOLOCAUST (2014); George J. Annas, The Legacy of the Nuremberg 
Doctors’ Trial to American Bioethics and Human Rights, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 19, 20–23 (2009). 
 20.  See generally ROBERT JAY LIPTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE (1988); ULF SCHMIDT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG: LEO ALEXANDER AND THE 
NAZI DOCTOR’S TRIAL (Richard Clogg ed., 2004); PAUL JULIAN WEINDLING, NAZI MEDICINE AND THE 
NUREMBERG TRIALS: FROM MEDICAL WAR CRIMES TO INFORMED CONSENT (2004). 
 21.  See generally HORST H. FREYHOFER, THE NUREMBERG MEDICAL TRIAL: THE HOLOCAUST 
AND THE ORIGIN OF THE NUREMBERG MEDICAL CODE (Frank J. Coppa ed., 2004); PAUL WEINDLING, 
VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS OF NAZI HUMAN EXPERIMENTS: SCIENCE AND SUFFERING IN THE HOLOCAUST 
(2015).  
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against humanity. Count Three of the Indictment, issued on October 6, 1945, 
classified the scientific and medical experiments conducted by Nazi 
Germany as war crimes.22 In his Opening Statement to the IMT, Justice 
Robert Jackson referenced the horrific experiments performed at Dachau, 
stating that “[h]ere Nazi degeneracy reached its nadir.”23 During the trial, the 
prosecution presented testimony and evidence of medical experimentation 
performed by Nazi Germany during the war. The Final Judgment of the 
Tribunal held that these experiments constituted murder and ill-treatment of 
both civilians and prisoners of war and were, therefore, war crimes.24 
While the IMT addressed human experimentation, it did not conduct a 
full review of these claims. A full accounting of the human experimentation 
program would occur in subsequent military proceedings established under 
Control Council Law No. 10 by the Allied Powers.25 Indeed, the United 
States determined that the first proceedings by a U.S. military tribunal would 
examine the role of the medical profession in the atrocities committed during 
the war.26 
In United States v. Brandt, a U.S. military tribunal considered the 
criminal responsibility of several German doctors and other government 
officials who conducted medical and scientific experiments on non-
consenting prisoners.27 The twenty-three defendants were charged with 
committing crimes against humanity and war crimes.  Specifically, Count 
Two of the Indictment charged the defendants with war crimes for 
conducting numerous forms of human experimentation on prisoners held in 
concentration camps, extermination camps, and medical facilities. Count 
Three charged the defendants with crimes against humanity for the same 
acts. The experiments conducted by the defendants on human beings 
included: high altitude experiments, hypothermia experiments, malaria 
 
 22.  International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, in 1 NAZI CONSPIRACY & AGGRESSION 
13, 33–34 (1946). Count Four of the Indictment, which addressed crimes against humanity, incorporated 
many of the charges set forth in Count Three, which addressed war crimes. 
 23.  Justice Robert H. Jackson, Opening Address for the United States, (Nov. 21, 1945) in 1 NAZI 
CONSPIRACY & AGGRESSION 114 (1946). 
 24.  NAZI CONSPIRACY & AGGRESSION: OPINION AND JUDGMENT 61, 81–82 (1946). The Tribunal 
also classified the SS (Schutzstaffel) as a criminal organization in light of its complicity in human 
experimentation committed during the war. Id. at 98–100. 
 25.  Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Peace and Against Humanity (Dec. 20, 1945) in 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50–55 
(1946). 
 26.  See generally KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS 
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 50–53, 85–87 (2011); KIM CHRISTIAN PRIEMEL, THE BETRAYAL: 
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS AND GERMAN DIVERGENCE 245–55 (2016).  
 27.  See generally Military Tribunal No. 1, in 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1949). The case is also 
referred to as the Medical Case or the Doctors’ Case.   
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experiments, jaundice experiments, typhus experiments, seawater 
experiments, mustard gas experiments, poison experiments, sulfanilamide 
experiments, incendiary gas experiments, and sterilization experiments.28  
In his Opening Statement to the tribunal, U.S. prosecutor Telford Taylor 
acknowledged the defendants who committed these despicable crimes were 
professionals who acted “in the name of medical science.”29 
They are not ignorant men. Most of them are trained physicians and some 
of them are distinguished scientists. Yet these defendants, all of whom 
were fully able to comprehend the nature of their acts, and most of whom 
were exceptionally qualified to form a moral and professional judgment 
in this respect, are responsible for wholesale murder and unspeakably 
cruel tortures.30 
Taylor also emphasized the importance of promoting accountability for such 
acts and the need for an historical record “so that no one can ever doubt that 
they were fact and not fable . . . .”31 
The trial lasted over seven months. Thousands of documents were 
submitted, and numerous witnesses testified at the trial.32 Several prominent 
doctors and scientists testified on behalf of the prosecution about the 
requirements for medical and scientific research and the legality of non-
consensual human experimentation.33 They discussed the importance of 
seeking a subject’s knowing and voluntary consent and that this was a 
necessary condition for human experimentation. They also addressed a 
doctor’s obligation to minimize a subject’s physical and mental suffering in 
any experiment.34 
In its final judgment, the tribunal acknowledged the systematic nature 
of human experimentation in Nazi Germany. 
These experiments were not the isolated and casual acts of individual 
doctors and scientists working solely on their own responsibility, but were 
the product of coordinated policy-making and planning at high 
governmental, military, and Nazi Party levels, conducted as an integral 
part of the total war effort. They were ordered, sanctioned, permitted, or 
approved by persons in positions of authority who under all principles of 
 
 28.  Id. at 11–16. 
 29.  Id. at 27. 
 30.  Id. at 28. 
 31.  Id. at 27.   
 32.  See id. at 92–909. 
 33.  Military Tribunals No. 1, in 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 80–86 (1949) [hereinafter Brandt II].  
 34.  During the trial, the defendants argued that U.S. medical practice also engaged in human 
experimentation without informed consent. HELLER, supra note 26, at 85-87; PRIEMEL, supra note 26, at 
250-55. 
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law were under the duty to know about these things and to take steps to 
terminate or prevent them.35 
The tribunal determined these experiments were conducted on individuals 
who did not consent. “In no case was the experimental subject at liberty of 
his own free choice to withdraw from any experiment.”36 The tribunal also 
determined that the experiments caused extraordinary suffering. “In every 
one of the experiments the subjects experienced extreme pain or torture, and 
in most of them they suffered permanent injury, mutilation, or death, either 
as a direct result of the experiments or because of lack of adequate follow-
up care.”37 For these reasons, the tribunal concluded that the claims of non-
consensual human experimentation constituted both crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.38 
Sixteen defendants were found guilty, and seven were acquitted. The 
defendants who were found guilty were sentenced to death, life 
imprisonment, or prison terms ranging from ten to twenty-five years.39 The 
U.S. Supreme Court declined to consider the defendants’ petition for review, 
and the death sentences were implemented shortly after the Court’s ruling.40 
The U.S. military tribunal’s decision in Brandt is particularly 
significant because the court acknowledged that basic principles must be 
observed in human experimentation. In particular, the tribunal enunciated a 
set of ten principles to satisfy moral, ethical, and legal concerns in cases of 
human experimentation: 
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely 
essential. This means that the person involved should have legal 
capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to 
exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any 
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other 
ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient 
knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter 
involved, as to enable him to make an understanding and 
enlightened decision. This latter element requires that, before the 
acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject, 
there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and 
purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to 
be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be 
expected; and the effects upon his health or person, which may 
possibly come from his participation in the experiment. The duty 
and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests 
 
 35.  Brandt II, supra note 33, at 181.   
 36.  Id. at 183. 
 37.  Id.   
 38.  Id. at 181.   
 39.  Id. at 298–300.   
 40.  Id. at 330; see also Brandt v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948).   
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upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the 
experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not 
be delegated to another with impunity.  
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the 
good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, 
and not random and unnecessary in nature. 
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results 
of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history 
of the disease or other problem under study, that the anticipated 
results will justify the performance of the experiment. 
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all 
unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury. 
5. No experiment should be conducted, where there is an a priori 
reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, 
perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians 
also serve as subjects. 
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that 
determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be 
solved by the experiment. 
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities 
provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote 
possibilities of injury, disability, or death. 
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically 
qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be 
required through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct 
or engage in the experiment. 
9. During the course of the experiment, the human subject should 
be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end, if he has reached the 
physical or mental state, where continuation of the experiment 
seemed to him to be impossible. 
10. During the course of the experiment, the scientist in charge must 
be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has 
probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior 
skill and careful judgement required of him, that a continuation of 
the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the 
experimental subject.41 
These principles are now known as the Nuremberg Code, and they have 
played a prominent role in the medical and scientific fields since their 
adoption.42 
 
 41.  Brandt II, supra note 33, at 181–82.   
 42.  See generally NORBERT EHRENFREUND, THE NUREMBERG LEGACY: HOW THE NAZI WAR 
CRIMES TRIALS CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY 149 (2007); George J. Annas & Michael Grodin, 
Medical Ethics and Human Rights: Legacies of Nuremberg, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 111 (1999); 
Michael H. Kater, CENTRAL EUROPEAN HISTORY 118 (1994) (reviewing GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL 
A. GRODIN: THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN 
EXPERIMENTATION (1992)). 
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Several other criminal proceedings under Control Council Law No. 10 
also addressed non-consensual human experimentation.43 In United States v. 
Milch, the defendant, Erhard Milch, served as an Inspector General and Field 
Marshall in the German Air Force. He was charged by a U.S. military 
tribunal with several counts.44 In Count Two, Milch was charged with war 
crimes for authorizing medical experiments at Dachau to assess the effects 
of low temperature and air pressure on human beings. In analyzing the illegal 
experimentation charge, the tribunal considered seven factors: 
1. Were low-pressure and freezing experiments carried on at 
Dachau? 
2. Were they of a character to inflict torture and death on the 
subjects? 
3. Did the defendant personally participate in them? 
4. Were they conducted under his direction or command? 
5. Were they conducted with prior knowledge on his part that they 
might be excessive or inhuman? 
6. Did he have the power or opportunity to prevent or stop them? 
7. If so, did he fail to act, thereby becoming particeps criminis and 
accessory to them?45 
The tribunal found the first two factors, which it defined as the corpus 
delicti, were met. According to the tribunal, the experiments, “performed 
under the specious guise of science, were barbarous and inhuman.”46 Despite 
this, the tribunal found Milch not guilty of war crimes because he did not 
personally participate in the experiments, direct that they be performed, or 
even know of them.47 However, Milch was found guilty on several other 
counts, including the use of slave labor, and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Japan also conducted non-consensual human experimentation during 
the Second World War.48 These experiments were similar to those carried 
 
 43.  See also United States v. Pohl, in 5 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 193, 986–88 (1949) (decision of U.S. 
military tribunal holding Oswald Pohl guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity for allowing 
human experimentation on prisoners); Trial of Rudolf Hoess, in 7 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS 11 (1948) (decision of Supreme National Tribunal of Poland holding Rudolf Hoess guilty for 
allowing human experimentation on Auschwitz prisoners). 
 44.  2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 360–64 (1949).   
 45.  Id. at 774.   
 46.  Id. at 775–76.   
 47.  Id. at 777–79. 
 48.  See JAPAN’S WARTIME MEDICAL ATROCITIES: COMPARATIVE INQUIRIES IN SCIENCE (Jing-Bao 
Nie et al. eds., 2010); Zachary D. Kaufman, Transitional Justice Delayed Is Not Transitional Justice 
Denied: Contemporary Confrontation of Japanese Human Experimentation During World War II 
Through a People’s Tribunal, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 645, 645 (2008); Sheldon H. Harris, Japanese 
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out by Nazi Germany. They included studies on the effects of bacteriological 
and chemical weapons on human beings, as well as surgery and vivisection. 
Perhaps the most notorious of these experiments were performed by Unit 
731, a Japanese army unit stationed in occupied China during the war.49 The 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East did not prosecute any 
individuals for human experimentation.50 But, as information about the 
Japanese experimentation program emerged, calls for accountability grew 
among the Allied powers. As a result, several individuals were eventually 
prosecuted and convicted for these acts by U.S. and Soviet tribunals after the 
war.51 
These post-war tribunals were significant for several reasons. They 
established that informed consent was required in cases of human 
experimentation. This principle would become the universal standard for all 
medical and scientific experimentation.52 They determined that non-
consensual human experimentation was a violation of international law and 
established that individuals could be subjected to criminal liability for 
committing such acts. These developments were soon codified in several 
post-war agreements. 
B. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and Humanitarian Law 
The impact of the Nuremberg trials on the development of international 
law was immediate, and diplomatic negotiations soon began to codify the 
lessons of Nuremberg. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, which comprise four 
treaties, were eventually adopted to address the treatment of armed forces 
and civilians in times of armed conflict.53 References to the Nazi experience 
with human experimentation appear in both the travaux préparatoires and in 
each of the four treaties. All four treaties prohibit torture and inhuman 
 
Biomedical Experimentation During the World War II-Era, in 2 MILITARY MEDICAL ETHICS 463, 465 
(Thomas E. Beam ed., 2003).  
 49.  See generally Tsuneishi Kei-ichi, Reasons for the Failure to Prosecute Unit 731 and its 
Significance, in BEYOND VICTOR’S JUSTICE? THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL REVISITED 176 (Yuki 
Tanaka et al. eds., 2011); PETER WILLIAMS & DAVID WALLACE, UNIT 731: JAPAN’S SECRET BIOLOGICAL 
WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II (1989).  
 50.  NEIL BOISTER & ROBERT CRYER, THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: A 
REAPPRAISAL 63 (2008). 
 51.  See PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN 
THE EAST, 1945-1951, at 79–80, 88–89, 152–54 (1979). 
 52.  See generally Evelyne Shuster, Fifty Years Later: The Significance of the Nuremberg Code, 
337 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1436 (1997). 
 53.  See generally THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY (Andrew Clapham et al. 
eds., 2015). 
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treatment in times of armed conflict.54 But, they also address human 
experimentation as a discrete act, although they do so in different ways. 
The First and Second Geneva Conventions, which address members of 
the armed forces in the field and at sea respectively, prohibit biological 
experiments and prohibit creating conditions that expose individuals to 
contagion or infection.55 According to the Commentary provided by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), these provisions were 
intended “to put an end for all time to criminal practices of which certain 
prisoners have been the victims, and also to prevent wounded or sick in 
captivity from being used as ‘guinea-pigs’ for medical experiments.”56 The 
ICRC Commentary adds that this provision is not meant to prevent 
therapeutic treatment that is necessitated by an individual’s medical 
condition and a desire to improve that condition.57 The First and Second 
Geneva Conventions also provide that torture and inhuman treatment, 
including biological experiments, constitute grave breaches which would 
subject perpetrators to criminal liability.58 According to the ICRC 
Commentary, the memory of the atrocities committed against certain 
prisoners “led to these acts being included in the list of grave breaches.”59 
The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, which address prisoners of 
war and civilians, respectively, also prohibit physical mutilation and medical 
or scientific experiments, although the wording in each treaty is slightly 
different.60 The Third Geneva Convention provides that prisoners of war may 
 
 54.  For an exhaustive review of state practice regarding the prohibition against non-consensual 
human experimentation in times of armed conflict, see 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW: PRACTICE 2167-89 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).  
 55.  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the 
Armed Forces at Sea art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]. 
 56.  INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR 
THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 
139 (Jean S. Pictet et al. eds., 1952) [hereinafter ICRC GENEVA I COMMENTARY]; INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: II GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF 
THE CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA 91 (Jean 
S. Pictet et al. eds., 1960) [hereinafter ICRC GENEVA II COMMENTARY]. 
 57.  ICRC GENEVA I COMMENTARY, supra note 56, at 139 (“Doctors must be free to resort to the 
new remedies which science offers, provided always that such remedies have first been satisfactorily 
proved to be innocuous and that they are administered for purely therapeutic purposes.”). 
 58.  First Geneva Convention, supra note 55, art. 50; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 55, 
art. 51; see Paola Gaeta, Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, in Clapham, supra note 53, at 615. 
 59.  ICRC GENEVA II COMMENTARY, supra note 56, at 269.  
 60.  See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 13, 130, Aug. 12, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 32, 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 
Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
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not be subjected to “physical mutilation or to medical or scientific 
experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or 
hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.”61 
Similarly, the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that protected persons 
may not be subjected to “mutilation and medical or scientific experiments 
not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person” or “to any 
other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.”62 
The ICRC Commentaries to the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions 
indicate that these provisions were adopted in response to the atrocities 
committed during the Second World War and to ensure that such abuses were 
not repeated.63 The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions also provide that 
torture and inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, constitute 
grave breaches that would expose perpetrators to criminal liability.64 
Common Article 3, which appears in all four Geneva Conventions, 
addresses basic rights in non-international armed conflicts.65 This provision 
requires humane treatment of detainees, and prohibits “violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture.”66 While non-consensual human experimentation is not specifically 
mentioned in Common Article 3, the travaux préparatoires make clear that 
its provisions cover such treatment. According to the ICRC Commentary, 
the issue of human experimentation was considered and discussed during the 
negotiations, but the drafters concluded it was unnecessary to include such 
an explicit provision.67 
The prohibitions set forth in the 1949 Geneva Conventions were 
affirmed and extended by the 1977 Protocols. Additional Protocol I, which 
addresses the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, provides 
 
 61.  Third Geneva Convention, supra note 60, art. 13. 
 62.  Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 60, art. 32. 
 63.  INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 141 (Jean S. Pictet et al. eds., 1960) [hereinafter 
ICRC GENEVA III COMMENTARY]; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV 
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 224 (Jean 
S. Pictet et al. eds., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC GENEVA IV COMMENTARY].   
 64.  Third Geneva Convention, supra note 60, art. 130; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 60, 
art. 147. 
 65.  Lindsay Moir, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict, in Clapham, supra note 53, 
at 391. 
 66.  See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 55, art. 3. 
 67.  ICRC GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 63, at 39 (“At one stage of the discussions, 
additions were considered—with particular reference to the biological “experiments” of evil memory, 
practiced on inmates of concentration camps. The idea was rightly abandoned, since biological 
experiments are among the acts covered by (a). Besides, it is always dangerous to try to go into too much 
detail—especially in such a domain.”). 
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that the physical or mental health and integrity of persons who are interned, 
detained, or otherwise deprived of liberty shall not be endangered by any 
unjustified act or omission.68 In fact, an entire provision is devoted to this 
principle. Article 11 prohibits “any medical procedure which is not 
indicated by the state of health of the person concerned and which is not 
consistent with generally accepted medical standards which would be 
applied under similar medical circumstances to persons who are nationals of 
the Party conducting the procedure and who are in no way deprived of 
liberty.”69 It specifically prohibits medical or scientific experiments on 
detained persons, except in cases where such experiments are indicated by 
the health of the detained person and which are consistent with medical 
standards.70 Violations of these provisions are considered grave breaches.71 
According to the ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols, 
Article 11 was drafted “to clarify and develop the protection of persons 
protected by the Conventions and the Protocol against medical procedures 
not indicated by their state of health, and particularly against unlawful 
medical experiments.”72 This obligation to protect applies to both the 
physical and mental health of detained persons. It would apply, for example, 
to medical experiments that affect the mental equilibrium of persons, 
including prolonged solitary confinement.73 The ICRC Commentary also 
recognizes that “mental health and integrity can be particularly endangered 
by the practice known as ‘brainwashing’, i.e., the massive injection of 
propaganda by more or less scientific means.”74 The Commentary defines 
medical procedure “to mean any procedure which has the purpose of 
influencing the state of health of the person undergoing it.”75 To be 
authorized, a medical procedure must fulfill two conditions.  First, “[i]t must 
be indicated by the state of the health of the person concerned.”76 Second, it 
“must be consistent with generally accepted medical standards . . . .”77  
 
 68.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 11(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].  
 69.  Id.   
 70.  Id. art. 11(2)(b).   
 71.  Id. arts. 11(4); 85(3). 
 72.  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 150 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter 
ICRC ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL COMMENTARY]. 
 73.  Id. at 152.   
 74.  Id.   
 75.  Id. at 154.   
 76.  Id. at 155. 
 77.  Id.   
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Significantly, consent cannot justify medical procedures that do not fulfill 
these two conditions.78 
Additional Protocol II, which addresses the protection of victims of 
non-international armed conflicts, contains similar provisions for protecting 
the physical or mental health and integrity of detained persons.79 Article 5(2) 
requires that those who are responsible for the internment or detention of 
persons deprived of liberty in times of non-international armed conflict must 
ensure that the “physical or mental health and integrity” of detained persons 
“shall not be endangered by any unjustified act or omission.”80 
“Accordingly, it is prohibited to subject [detained persons] to any medical 
procedure which is not indicated by the state of health of the person 
concerned, and which is not consistent with the generally accepted medical 
standards applied to free persons under similar medical circumstances.”81 
The ICRC Commentary indicates that the interpretation of Article 11(1) of 
Additional Protocol I and Article 5(2)(e) of Additional Protocol II “is 
identical and consequently reference can also be made to the commentary on 
Article 11 (Protection of Persons) of Protocol I.”82 Accordingly, the 
principles regarding human experimentation are similar in both international 
and non-international armed conflicts. 
More recently, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Rome Statute) classifies human experimentation as both a grave breach of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and as a violation of the laws and customs of 
war.83 Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute grants the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, including “[t]orture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments.”84 Article 8(2)(b)(x) grants the ICC jurisdiction over other 
serious violations of the laws and customs of war committed in international 
armed conflict, including “physical mutilation or to medical or scientific 
experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or 
 
 78.  Id. at 157. 
 79.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].   
 80.  Id. art. 5(2)(e).  
 81.  Id. 
 82.  ICRC ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 72, at 1391.  
 83.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE (2d ed. 2016). While the definition of crimes against 
humanity does not specifically reference non-consensual human experimentation, commentators have 
pointed out such acts would likely be classified as such. ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 238 (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3d ed. 2016).  
 84.  Rome Statute, supra note 83, art. 8(2)(a)(ii).  
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hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her 
interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such 
person or persons; . . .”85 Article 8(2)(e)(xi) grants the ICC jurisdiction over 
the same conduct committed in non-international armed conflict.86 
To assist the ICC, the Rome Statute authorized the adoption of a 
separate document to address the elements of crimes in more detail.87 The 
ICC Elements of Crimes, which are read in conjunction with the Rome 
Statute, were adopted by the Preparatory Commission.88 They offer 
additional details on the prohibitions regarding biological, medical, and 
scientific experimentation. For example, the following elements are 
identified with respect to conducting biological experiments, which is 
designated in Article 8(2)(a)(ii)-3 as a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions: 
1.  The perpetrator subjected one or more persons to a particular 
biological experiment. 
2.  The experiment seriously endangered the physical or mental 
health or integrity of such person or persons. 
3.  The intent of the experiment was non-therapeutic and it was 
neither justified by medical reasons nor carried out in such person’s 
or persons’ interest. 
4.  Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
5.  The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established that protected status. 
6.  The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with 
an international armed conflict. 
7.  The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.89 
The travaux préparatoires to the ICC Elements of Crimes provide 
additional insights into this provision.90 For example, an initial proposal 
would have required death or serious bodily or mental harm to occur in order 
 
 85.  Id. art. 8(2)(b)(x); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant 
to Paragraph 2 of Security Resolution 808, Art. 2(b), U.N. Doc. S/25704, (May 3, 1993) (including 
identical language regarding biological experiments committed against protected persons, subsequently 
adopted as the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia).   
 86.  Rome Statute, supra note 83, art. 8(2)(e)(xi). 
 87.  Id. art. 9(1).   
 88.  International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11_Eng 
(2011) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes].   
 89.  Id. art. 8(2)(a)(ii)-3.   
 90.  See KNUT DÖRMAN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SOURCES AND COMMENTARY 70–75 (2003). 
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to establish liability.91 This high standard was rejected in favor of the lower 
standard now set forth in the provision which only requires that the health or 
integrity of a person is seriously endangered.92 The travaux préparatoires 
also reveal that the provision on non-therapeutic experiments was heavily 
influenced by the language of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols.93 
The ICC Elements of Crimes provide additional details regarding 
medical or scientific experiments, which are designated under Article 
8(2)(b)(x)-2 as serious violations of the laws and customs of war committed 
in international armed conflict: 
1.  The perpetrator subjected one or more persons to a medical or 
scientific experiment. 
2.  The experiment caused death or seriously endangered the 
physical or mental health or integrity of such person or persons. 
3.  The conduct was neither justified by the medical, dental or 
hospital treatment of such person or persons concerned nor carried 
out in such person’s or persons’ interest. 
4.  Such person or persons were in the power of an adverse party. 
5.  The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with 
an international armed conflict. 
6.  The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.94 
The ICC Elements of Crimes add that consent is not a defense to this 
crime.95 In addition, they reveal that medical procedures are only permitted 
if they are “indicated by the state of health of the person concerned” and 
“consistent with generally accepted medical standards which would be 
applied under similar medical circumstances to persons who are nationals of 
the party conducting the procedure and who are in no way deprived of 
liberty.”96 A similar provision applies with respect to non-international 
armed conflicts.97 
 
 91.  Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Proposal Submitted by the 
United States of America: Draft Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(a)(ii)-3, U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/1999.DP.4/Add.2 (Feb. 4, 1999). 
 92.  See Triffterer & Ambos, supra note 83, at 337 (“[T]he concrete danger of the mentioned harm 
is sufficient for the crime to be completed, not only when the harm actually occurs. To know whether a 
person’s health has been seriously endangered is a matter of judgment and a court should determine this 
not only on the basis of the conduct of the perpetrator, but also on the foreseeable consequences having 
regard to the state of health of the person subjected to them.”). 
 93.  DÖRMAN, supra note 90, at 71–73. 
 94.  ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 88, art. 8(2)(b)(x)-2.   
 95.  Id. art. 8(2)(b)(x)-1 n.46.   
 96.  Id.   
 97.  Id. art. 8(2)(e)(xi)-1 n.69.   
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In sum, the prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation 
traces its origins to the Nuremberg tribunal. It has since been codified in 
international humanitarian law and now regulates state behavior in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts. 
C. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Human 
Rights Law 
The prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation is also 
codified in international human rights law. There is no reference to this norm 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted 
by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948.98 While the UDHR prohibits torture 
and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, it does not explicitly 
reference the prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation.99 
The travaux préparatoires reveal that the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights, which was charged with drafting the UDHR, discussed whether to 
include such a provision in the document.100 During the early stages of the 
negotiations, French diplomat Rene Cassin asked whether the drafters should 
take into consideration the issue of human experimentation in the provision 
addressing torture. “Do some humans have the right to expose others to 
medical experiments and do any have the right to inflict suffering upon other 
human beings without their consent, even for ends that may appear good?”101 
If a specific example of torture was included in the draft article, Ralph 
Lindsay Harry of Australia asked whether it would be necessary to provide 
other examples of torture.102 Eventually, the drafters did not include a 
reference to non-consensual human experimentation in the final version of 
the UDHR because “it could be argued that the shorter version of the article 
had already implicitly made such experimentation unlawful.”103 As noted by 
Bodil Begtrup of Denmark, the prohibition against torture would cover cases 
such as when “the Nazis had used prisoners for medical experiments such as 
vivisection.”104  In fact, “[i]t should . . . be made perfectly clear that members 
 
 98.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 99.  Id. art. 5. 
 100.  JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, 
DRAFTING, AND INTENT 42 (1999); Ann-Marie Bolin Pennegård, Article 5, in THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 123 (Gudmundur S. 
Alfredsson & Asbjorn Eide eds., 1999). 
 101.  U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Summary Record of the Third Meeting, at 13, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.3 (June 13, 1947). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Ann-Marie Bolin Pennegård, Article 5, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 121, 123 (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjørn Eide eds., 1999). 
 104.  U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninth Meeting of the 
Third Committee, at 213, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.109 (Oct. 21, 1948). 
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of the Committee were unanimous in thinking that the practice of vivisection 
on persons whose consent had not been obtained constituted a violation of 
the most elementary human rights.”105 
The U.N. Commission on Human Rights was responsible for drafting 
both the UDHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).106 In fact, the drafting process for the UDHR overlapped with the 
early negotiations for the ICCPR. Accordingly, the UDHR delegates were 
aware that a provision on non-consensual human experimentation was under 
consideration during the ICCPR negotiations. 
Article 7 of the ICCPR provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In 
particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation.”107 According to the travaux préparatoires, the 
initial drafts considered by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights did not 
address human experimentation.108 They focused only on the prohibition 
against torture and the corollary prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment. Early in the drafting process, the United Kingdom 
submitted a proposal to the Drafting Committee that “[n]o person shall be 
subjected to . . . any form of physical mutilation or medical or scientific 
experimentation against his will.”109 The Drafting Committee accepted the 
proposal, and it was revised on several occasions as a result of various 
proposals. By the end of the initial phase of the drafting process, the 
provision read, “[n]o one shall be subjected to any form of physical 
 
 105.  Id.; see also U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Summary Record of the Hundred and Tenth 
Meeting of the Third Committee, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 110 (Oct. 22, 1948) (statement of the 
Venezuelan representative supporting the proposal of the Danish representative regarding medical 
experimentation). 
 106.  See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, Introductory Essay: The Drafting and Significance of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE TRAVAUX 
PRÉPARATOIRES VOLUME I, at lxxi–lxxv (2013). 
 107.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. See generally MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 147–60 (1987). 
 108.  See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Drafting Comm., Draft Outline of International Bill 
of Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3 (June 4, 1947); U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Drafting Comm., 
Text of Letter from Lord Dukeston, the United Kingdom representative on the Human Rights 
Commission, to the Secretary General of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/4 (June 5, 1947). 
The ICCPR was initially drafted by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.  On April 16, 1954, the 
Commission submitted its draft to the U.N. Economic and Social Council for further consideration. The 
ICCPR was finally adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 1966.  
 109.  U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Drafting Comm., First Session, Summary Record of the Tenth 
Meeting, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.10 (June 20, 1947); U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Drafting 
Comm. on an Int’l Bill of Human Rights, Report of the Drafting Committee to the Commission on Human 
Rights, at 82, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/21 (July 1, 1947).   
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mutilation or medical or scientific experimentation against his will.”110 
Originally, this was proposed as a separate article to the ICCPR.111 The 
provision was subsequently joined in a single article along with the 
prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment.112 
The travaux préparatoires reveal the provision regarding medical and 
scientific experimentation “was intended to prevent the recurrence of 
atrocities such as those committed in concentration camps during the Second 
World War.”113 According to Lebanese diplomat Charles Malik, this article 
should be considered in light of the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany. 
“The basic idea was to explain in an international instrument that the 
conscience of mankind had been shocked by inhuman acts in Nazi Germany 
and therefore a positive and condemnatory article was needed.”114 Indeed, 
the “confessions of German and Japanese war criminals had clearly shown 
the need to brand as a heinous crime the abuse of scientific and medical 
experimentation and to prevent its repetition.”115 Some country 
representatives questioned the need for a specific provision on medical and 
scientific experimentation when such action was presumably covered by the 
prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.  
 
 110.  U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Drafting Comm., Second Session, Twenty-Third Meeting, at 
2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.23 (May 10, 1948). At the conclusion of its initial work, the Drafting 
Committee forwarded some possible limitations to the Commission on Human Rights.  “This list is as 
follows: (1) Compulsory vaccination (United States of America); (2) Legitimate medical and scientific 
experimentation in hospitals for the insane, with the consent of parent or guardian of the patient (United 
States of America); (3) Emergency operations undertaken to save the life of patient, where the patient is 
unable to give his consent or where a person empowered to give consent on behalf of the patient gives 
such consent (United States of America); (4) Other limitations may be developed later (United States of 
America).” U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Report of the Third Session of the Commission on Human Rights, 
at 17, U.N. Doc. E/800 (June 28, 1948). 
 111.  U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Drafting Comm., Report of the Drafting Committee to the 
Commission on Human Rights, at 18–19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/95 (May 21, 1948).   
 112.  See U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sixth Session, Summary Record of the Hundred and 
Ninety-Ninth Meeting, at 19, U.N Doc. E/CN.4/SR.199 (May 31, 1950); U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Sixth Session, Summary Record of the Hundred and Eighty-Third Meeting, at 4–13, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.183 (May 17, 1950); U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Fifth Session, Summary Record of the 
Ninety-First Meeting, at 11–16, U.N Doc. E/CN.4/SR.91 (May 31, 1949). 
 113.  U.N. Secretary General, Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on 
Human Rights, at 31, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (July 1, 1955).  
 114.  U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Drafting Comm., Second Session, Twenty-Third Meeting, at 
3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.23 (May 10, 1948). 
 115.  U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Eighth Session, Summary of the Three-Hundred and Twelfth 
Meeting, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.312 (June 12, 1952); see also U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Sixth Session, Summary Record of the Hundred and Eighty-Second Meeting, at 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.182 (May 17, 1950) (“The covenant should include such an article specifically to prohibit the 
perpetration of crimes such as the Nazis had committed in Germany in the name of scientific 
experimentation.”).   
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However, the majority of representatives believed a separate provision was 
necessary.116 The matter was so important, they felt it required a separate 
provision, “even at the risk of repetition.”117 
The final version of Article 7 contains no exceptions to justify non-
consensual human experimentation. Indeed, the ICCPR allows for no 
derogation of Article 7.118 
The Human Rights Committee, which was established by the ICCPR to 
monitor treaty compliance among member states, has reaffirmed the 
prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation in several 
statements. In General Comment No. 7, for example, the Committee 
acknowledged Article 7’s prohibition and indicated that “more attention 
should be given to the possible need and means to ensure the observance of 
this provision.”119 In addition, the Committee noted that special protection is 
necessary “in the case of persons not capable of giving their consent.”120 The 
Committee reaffirmed its position on non-consensual human 
experimentation in General Comment No. 20, indicating that special 
protections were necessary for “persons not capable of giving valid consent, 
and in particular those under any form of detention or imprisonment.”121 
Significantly, the Human Rights Committee indicated that states have an 
obligation to enforce the provisions of Article 7 “whether inflicted by people 
acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private 
capacity.”122 
The Human Rights Committee has also expressed concern about state 
practice that fails to consider the requirement of informed consent in cases 
of human experimentation. In its 2006 Concluding Observations on the 
United States, for example, the Committee raised significant concerns about 
U.S. policies and their failure to ensure consent in cases of human 
experimentation: 
The State party should ensure that it meets its obligation under article 7 of 
the Covenant not to subject anyone without his/her free consent to medical 
or scientific experimentation . . . . When there is doubt as to the ability of 
 
 116.  U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sixth Session, Summary Record of the One-Hundred and 
Forty-First Meeting, at 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.141 (Apr. 7, 1950).  See also U.N. Comm’n on Human 
Rights, Sixth Session, Summary Record of the One-Hundred and Eighty-Third Meeting, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.183 (May 17, 1950).   
 117.  U.N. Secretary General, supra note 113, at 31. 
 118.  ICCPR, supra note 107, art. 4(2). 
 119.  U.N. Secretary General, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994). 
 120.  Id.   
 121.  Id. at 31. 
 122.  Id. at 30. 
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a person or a category of persons to give such consent, e.g. prisoners, the 
only experimental treatment compatible with article 7 would be treatment 
chosen as the most appropriate to meet the medical needs of the 
individual.123 
The Human Rights Committee expressed similar concerns in its 2001 
Concluding Observations on the Netherlands: 
The State party should reconsider its Medical Research (Human Subjects) 
Act in the light of the Committee’s concerns, in order to ensure that even 
high potential value of scientific research is not used to justify severe risks 
to the subjects of research. The State party should further remove minors 
and other persons unable to give genuine consent from any medical 
experiments which do not directly benefit these individuals (non-
therapeutic medical research).124 
Unlike the ICCPR, the prohibition against non-consensual human 
experimentation does not appear in the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention 
against Torture). The travaux préparatoires indicate the issue was 
considered during negotiations for the Convention against Torture, but it was 
ultimately excluded from the final text. During negotiations, the Swiss 
government proposed adding the following language to the definition of 
torture: “[i]t (the term ‘torture’) also means medical or scientific experiments 
that are not justified by a person’s state of health and serve no therapeutic 
purpose.”125 The Portuguese government, which was concerned with the use 
of psychiatry for political purposes, proposed the following language: “the 
use of psychiatry for one of the objects referred to in paragraph 1 or the abuse 
of psychiatry with a view to prolonging confinement of any person subjected 
to a measure or penalty involving deprivation of freedom shall be regarded 
as torture.”126 Barbados proposed expanding the definition of torture to 
include “the use of more sophisticated weapons such as ‘truth’ drugs where 
no physical or mental suffering is apparent in the complainant.”127 These 
proposals were ultimately rejected, in part, because such specificity might 
allow some states to evade the broad nature of the norm against torture.128 
 
 123.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee 
(United States of America), ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006). 
 124.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee 
(Netherlands), ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/NET (Aug. 27, 2001). 
 125.  U.N. Secretary-General, Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subject to any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314 (Dec. 19, 1978). 
 126.  Id. at 7. 
 127.  Id. at 5. 
 128.  Id. at 6; see also Nina Sibal (Chairman-Rapporteur), Report of the Working Group on a Draft 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 5, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/L.1470 (Mar. 12, 1979). 
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The prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation can be 
found in various international instruments relating to medical or scientific 
research. 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
Concerning Biomedical Research 
No research on a person may be carried out . . . without the informed, free, 
express, specific and documented consent of the person.129 
 
Declaration of Helsinki on the Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects 
6. The primary purpose of medical research involving human subjects is 
to understand the causes, development and effects of diseases and improve 
preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic interventions (methods, procedures 
and treatments). Even the best proven interventions must be evaluated 
continually through research for their safety, effectiveness, efficiency, 
accessibility and quality. 
7. Medical research is subject to ethical standards that promote and ensure 
respect for all human subjects and protect their health and rights. 
8. While the primary purpose of medical research is to generate new 
knowledge, this goal can never take precedence over the rights and 
interests of individual research subjects. 
9. It is the duty of physicians who are involved in medical research to 
protect the life, health, dignity, integrity, right to self-determination, 
privacy, and confidentiality of personal information of research subjects. 
The responsibility for the protection of research subjects must always rest 
with the physician or other health care professionals and never with the 
research subjects, even though they have given consent.130 
 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
1. Any preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic medical intervention is only 
to be carried out with the prior, free and informed consent of the person 
concerned, based on adequate information. The consent should, where 
appropriate, be express and may be withdrawn by the person concerned at 
any time and for any reason without disadvantage or prejudice. 
2. Scientific research should only be carried out with the prior, free, 
express and informed consent of the person concerned. The information 
should be adequate, provided in a comprehensible form and should 
include modalities for withdrawal of consent. Consent may be withdrawn 
 
 129.  Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Concerning 
Biomedical Research, art. 14(1), Jan. 25, 2005, CETS No. 195. 
 130.  World Med. Ass’n [WMA], Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects, arts. 6–9, (June 1964).  
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by the person concerned at any time and for any reason without any 
disadvantage or prejudice.131 
Other sources—ranging from regional human rights agreements to 
instruments addressing the rights of vulnerable persons—reaffirm the 
universal status of this norm and its operation throughout the world.132 
D. U.S. Law and Practice 
The United States has its own troubling history of individuals being 
subjected to human experimentation without informed consent.133 Because 
 
 131.  United Nations Educ., Sci. and Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Universal Declaration of Bioethics 
and Human Rights, art. 6, (Oct. 19, 2005). 
 132.  See League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, art. 9, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 
12 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005) (“No one shall be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation 
or to the use of his organs without his free consent and full awareness of the consequences and provided 
that ethical, humanitarian and professional rules are followed and medical procedures are observed to 
ensure his personal safety pursuant to the relevant domestic laws in force in each State party. Trafficking 
in human organs is prohibited in all circumstances.”); Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and 
Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, E.T.S. No. 164 (“Research on 
a person may only be undertaken if . . . the risks which may be incurred by that person are not 
disproportionate to the potential benefits of the research; . . . the persons undergoing research have been 
informed of their rights and the safeguards prescribed by law for their protection; [and] the necessary 
consent . . . has been given expressly, specifically and is documented.”); Council of Europe, Committee 
of Ministers, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, art. 22 (1973) (“The prisoners may 
not be submitted to medical or scientific experiments which may result in physical or moral injury to their 
person.”); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 15(1), Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 
3 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In 
particular, no one shall be subjected without his or her free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation.”); U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 
1 (2014), at 42, U.N. Doc. CPRD/C/GC/1 (May 19, 2014) (forced treatment by psychiatric and other 
health and medical professionals is a violation of the treaty); U.N. General Assembly, Body of Principles 
for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 22, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/43/173 (Dec. 9, 1988) (“No detained or imprisoned person shall, even with his consent, be 
subjected to any medical or scientific experimentation which may be detrimental to his health.”); G.A. 
Res. 37/194, U.N. Doc. A/37/51, at Principle 4, (Dec. 18, 1982) (“It is a contravention of medical ethics 
for health personnel, particularly physicians: (a) To apply their knowledge and skills in order to assist in 
the interrogation of prisoners and detainees in a manner that may adversely affect the physical or mental 
health or condition of such prisoners or detainees and which is not in accordance with the relevant 
international instruments; (b) To certify, or to participate in the certification of, the fitness of prisoners or 
detainees for any form of treatment or punishment that may adversely affect their physical or mental 
health and which is not in accordance with the relevant international instruments, or to participate in any 
way in the infliction of any such treatment or punishment which is not in accordance with the relevant 
international instruments.”). 
 133.  See, e.g., Marie Constance Scheperle, The Guatemala STD Inoculation Study as the Incentive 
to Change Modern Informed Consent Standards, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 425 (2012); 
Jennifer Y. Seo, Raising the Standard of Abortion Informed Consent: Lessons to be Learned from the 
Ethical and Legal Requirements for Consent to Medical Experimentation, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
357 (2011); JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1993); Jay Katz, 
Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS L.J. 7 (1993); Elliott J. Schuchardt, Walking a 
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of this, informed consent is now an integral component of all scientific and 
medical research in the United States. 
Federal law on human experimentation traces its origins to the 
influential Belmont Report of 1979, which was drafted by the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research.134 Its goal was to identify the basic ethical principles 
that should regulate human experimentation in the United States. The Report 
identified three such principles: respect, beneficence, and justice. The Report 
also acknowledged the role of the Nuremberg trials on the development of 
basic standards for human subject research. The Report served as the 
foundation for the subsequent Federal Policy for the Protection of Human 
Subjects, also known as the Common Rule, which was first published in 
1981.135 
The Common Rule provides detailed requirements regarding human 
subject research in the United States.136 Research is defined as “a systematic 
investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, 
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”137 A human 
subject is defined as “a living individual about whom an investigator 
(whether professional or student) conducting research obtains (1) data 
through intervention or interaction with the individual, or (2) identifiable 
private information.”138 The Common Rule goes on to provide detailed 
requirements regarding informed consent. It also contains additional 
requirements when research involves prisoners, children, and pregnant 
women. The Common Rule applies to most federal agencies. The CIA is 
required to comply with its standards pursuant to a 1981 Executive Order, 
which provides that “[n]o agency within the Intelligence Community shall 
sponsor, contract for or conduct research on human subjects except in 
accordance with guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Human 
Services. The subject’s informed consent shall be documented as required 
by those guidelines.”139 
 
Thin Line: Distinguishing Between Research and Medical Practice During Operation Desert Storm, 26 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 77 (1992).  
 134.  THE NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
RESEARCH, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF 
RESEARCH (1979). 
 135.  See generally Jerry Menikoff et al., The Common Rule, Updated, 376 N. ENGL. J. MED. 613 
(2017); RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A THEORY AND HISTORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 
(1986).  
 136.  45 C.F.R. § 46 (2018). 
 137.  Id. at § 46.102(d). 
 138.  Id. at § 46.102(f). 
 139.  Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R. § 2.10 (1981). 
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In 1992, the United States summarized its position on non-consensual 
human experimentation to the U.N. Human Rights Committee in fulfillment 
of its reporting requirements under the ICCPR: 
Non-consensual experimentation is illegal in the U.S. Specifically, it 
would violate the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable 
searches and seizures (including seizing a person’s body), the Fifth 
Amendment’s proscription against depriving one of life, liberty or 
property without due process, and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.140 
In its submission to the Committee, the United States noted that 
experimentation on prisoners is regulated by the U.S. Constitution, federal 
statutes, and administrative regulations.141 In fact, the federal government 
specifically prohibits medical experimentation on any inmates and there are 
strict regulations on research in prison settings.142 The United States 
reaffirmed these principles in subsequent reports to the Committee.143 
The prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation has 
been addressed in numerous U.S. cases, albeit with mixed results.144 The 
Nuremberg Code is often referenced in these cases although its principles 
are not always applied. In United States v. Stanley, for example, James 
Stanley was subjected to non-consensual experimentation while serving in 
the U.S. Army.  He was given LSD as part of a military experiment to study 
its effects on human beings.145 After suffering harmful side-effects for 
several years, Stanley discovered he had been subjected to experimentation. 
He then filed a civil lawsuit against the United States seeking redress for his 
 
 140.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties: United States of America, ¶ 178, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (1994). 
 141.  Id. ¶ 183. 
 142.  Id. ¶¶ 183-87. 
 143.  See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant: Fourth Periodic Report: United States of America, ¶ 187, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/4 (May 22, 2012); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Third Periodic Reports of States Parties 
Due in 2003: United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005). 
 144.  Most cases that raise claims of non-consensual human experimentation focus solely on 
domestic law and do not address international law. See, e.g., In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. 
Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979). However, 
some cases reference the Nuremberg Code and other international standards. See also White v. Paulsen, 
997 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Whitlock v. Duke University, 637 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D. N.C. 
1986); Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685 (1982); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical 
Corp., 84 N.J. 58 (1980); In re Weberlist, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783 (N.Y. 1974). 
 145.  United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671 (1987); see generally Michael J. O’Connor, Bearing 
True Faith and Allegiance? Allowing Recovery for Soldiers Under Fire in Military Experiments that 
Violate the Nuremberg Code, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 649 (2002); Martha J. Burns, They Fight 
to Protect Our Rights; Shouldn’t We Do the Same for Them? Intramilitary Immunity in Light of United 
States v. Stanley, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 127 (1988); Richard W. McKee, Defending an Indifferent 
Constitution: The Plight of Soldiers Used as Guinea Pigs, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 633 (1989). 
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injuries. The Supreme Court held that Stanley could not pursue his claim 
because federal statutes did not afford him a remedy and special factors 
counseled against recognizing a constitutional claim.146 While the majority 
opinion did not address the status of non-consensual human experimentation, 
Justice Brennan took a different approach in his dissenting opinion. 
According to Justice Brennan, such actions were contrary to the lessons of 
history. “The medical trials at Nuremberg in 1947 deeply impressed upon 
the world that experimentation with unknowing human subjects is morally 
and legally unacceptable.”147 He then cited the Nuremberg Code that was 
drafted by the U.S. military tribunal in United States v. Brandt.148 Justice 
O’Connor echoed these concerns in her dissent, stating that “[n]o judicially 
crafted rule should insulate from liability the involuntary and unknowing 
human experimentation alleged to have occurred in this case.”149 
The case of Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. considered the prohibition against 
non-consensual medical experimentation under international law.150 The 
Pfizer litigation arose out of a vaccination program pursued by Pfizer in 
Nigeria that was designed to test a new antibiotic called Trovan on 
children.151 According to the plaintiffs, the vaccination program was 
conducted without informed consent. After two weeks, the Pfizer team 
concluded the experiment and left the country without providing additional 
treatment. Several children died as a result of the experiments, and other 
children suffered blindness, paralysis, or brain-damage.152 
In August 2001, the plaintiffs filed a federal lawsuit against Pfizer and 
based jurisdiction on the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).153 The plaintiffs alleged 
that Pfizer “violated a customary international law norm prohibiting 
involuntary medical experimentation on humans when it tested an 
experimental antibiotic on children in Nigeria, including themselves, without 
their consent or knowledge.”154 After several legal proceedings, the district 
court dismissed the lawsuit. While it found non-consensual human 
experimentation violated international law, the district court determined that 
 
 146.  Stanley, 483 U.S. at 678–84. 
 147.  Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. at 709–10 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 150.  Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 2009); see generally Erin Talati, An Open 
Door to Ending Exploitation: Accountability for Violations of Informed Consent Under the Alien Tort 
Statute, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 231 (2006); David M. Carr, Pfizer’s Epidemic: A Need for International 
Regulation of Human Experimentation in Developing Countries, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 15 (2003). 
 151.  Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 169. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 168. Pfizer was also subject to civil and criminal proceedings in Nigeria. Id. at 206. 
 154.  Id. at 168. 
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the claim was not actionable under the ATS because none of the applicable 
international norms authorized a private right of action.155 
In July 2009, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s 
dismissal.156 The court determined that customary international law prohibits 
medical experimentation on human subjects without their consent. The court 
cited several sources, including United States v. Brandt, the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, and the ICCPR.157 The court also referenced the Declaration of 
Helsinki, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, and the 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.158 The court found 
that the prohibition against non-consensual medical experimentation was 
universal, specific, and of mutual concern to the international community. 
This history illustrates that from its origins with the trial of the Nazi 
doctors at Nuremburg through its evolution in international conventions, 
agreements, declarations, and domestic laws and regulations, the norm 
prohibiting nonconsensual medical experimentation on human subjects 
has become firmly embedded and has secured universal acceptance in the 
community of nations.159 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs had “pled facts sufficient to state a cause of action 
under the ATS for a violation of the norm of customary international law 
prohibiting medical experimentation on human subjects without their 
consent.”160 In 2011, the parties agreed to a confidential settlement, thereby 
ending the litigation in the United States. 
In sum, the prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation 
has existed for over seventy years and has been codified in numerous 
international instruments. It is also recognized in U.S. law. While the norm 
is described in various ways, its core elements remain constant. 
E. Defining the Prohibition against Non-Consensual Human 
Experimentation 
The prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation can be 
defined by three core elements, which synthesize the basic principles of 
national and international law.161  
 
 155.  Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ.8118(WHP), 2005 WL 1870811, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
9, 2005), rev’d, 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 156.  Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 169. 
 157.  Id. at 178–84. 
 158.  Id. at 181–83. 
 159.  Id. at 183–84. 
 160.  Id. at 187. 
 161.  Commentators have offered several definitions. See, e.g., Triffterer & Ambos, supra note 83, 
at 336 (“The term [biological experiments] in its ordinary meaning covers conduct the primary purpose 
of which is to study the (unknown) effects of a product or situation (e.g. extreme cold or altitude) on the 
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First, the prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation 
applies to any systematic form of medical, psychological, scientific, or 
biological research or experimentation conducted on human beings. 
Research or experimentation refers to any form of physical or mental 
intervention or observation that seeks to acquire generalizable information 
from or about a human being. By requiring that research or experimentation 
be systematic, the definition makes clear it only applies to acts that are 
intentional and designed to elicit information from the subject. This element 
applies to all forms of research or experimentation regardless of how such 
acts are identified or captioned. 
Second, the subject of the research or experimentation must provide 
informed consent. Such consent must be knowing, which requires the subject 
to understand all relevant information regarding the research or 
experimentation. Consent must also be voluntary. It must be provided by the 
subject without any form of coercion or fear of retaliation if consent is not 
provided. A narrow exception to informed consent may exist when a 
subject’s medical condition creates a life-threatening emergency, and the 
subject is unable to provide consent.162 However, such exceptions must be 
carefully regulated. 
Third, the research or experimentation must be justified by the subject’s 
medical or psychological condition and must be carried out in his or her 
individual interest. Research or experimentation may also be justified when 
it is designed to benefit society, and the subject is aware of this purpose and 
has provided informed consent.163 On such occasions, the social benefits 
must be carefully weighed against the potential risks to the subject. Because 
assessing the social benefits of research or experimentation is subjective and 
can be easily manipulated, it must be carefully regulated and subject to 
independent review. 
In addition to these core elements, the prohibition against non-
consensual human experimentation is influenced by two other 
considerations.  
First, vulnerable individuals are subject to additional protections. These 
individuals include children, prisoners, persons with disabilities, and other 
individuals with limited capacity or whose autonomy is otherwise 
 
human body.”); Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 1597 (“Human experimentation can be broadly defined as 
anything done to an individual to learn how it will affect him.”). 
 162.  See Catriona Macardle & Rachel Stanley, Autonomy and Exception from Informed-Consent 
Research, 11 AM. MED. ASS’N. J. ETH. 626, 626 (2009).  
 163.  See Danielle M. Wenner, The Social Value of Knowledge and International Clinical Research, 
15 DEV. WORLD BIOETHICS 76, 80 (2015). 
ACEVES_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  9:05 AM 
2018] INTERROGATION OR EXPERIMENTATION? 71 
affected.164 These individuals may lack the resources or ability to make 
informed decisions. Accordingly, greater scrutiny is required to determine 
whether consent was knowingly made by a vulnerable person. Likewise, the 
voluntary nature of consent is also subject to greater scrutiny. For individuals 
whose autonomy is restricted, such as prisoners, even greater scrutiny is 
required to establish their decisions were voluntary and not influenced by 
coercion or fear of retaliation. 
Second, medical and scientific professionals are subject to a higher 
standard when assessing whether human experimentation has occurred. As a 
general matter, these professions are governed by ethical standards that 
impose special obligations on their members.165 They have an obligation to 
protect the health and dignity of patients and research subjects. They must 
also comply with detailed requirements when working with human beings in 
a professional capacity. For example, the American Medical Association 
(AMA) has a detailed Code of Medical Ethics that addresses such topics as 
informed consent and research ethics.166 The American Psychological 
Association (APA) has developed a separate set of Ethical Principles and 
Code of Conduct for their discipline.167 Similarly, the American Psychiatric 
Association has adopted the Principles of Medical Ethics especially 
applicable to psychiatry.168 For these reasons, a rebuttable presumption that 
human experimentation has been conducted should apply when a medical or 
scientific professional is involved in the study of human behavior. 
While the definition of non-consensual human experimentation is 
firmly established, the historical record identifies several possible points of 
contention. First, some treaties provide different standards depending on 
whether non-consensual human experimentation occurs in times of peace or 
armed conflict.169 Second, some treaties provide different standards 
depending on whether a conflict is an international or non-international 
 
 164.  See generally Research Involving Human Subjects, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, 
https://humansubjects.nih.gov/. 
 165.  See M. Gregg Bloche, When Doctors First Do Harm, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2016, at A27. 
 166.  COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF 
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2008). 
 167.  AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF 
CONDUCT (2017). In 2016, they added the following provision to the Code: “[p]sychologists do not 
participate in, facilitate, assist, or otherwise engage in torture, defined as any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person, or in any other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading behavior that violates 3.04a [avoiding harm].” Id. at 3.04(b). 
 168.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2013); see also Brian H. 
Richardson, “We Tortured Some Folks”: Science, Ethics, and Government in the APA Torture Scandal, 
57 JURIMETRICS J. 81 (2016). 
 169.  Compare Rome Statute, supra note 83, art. 8, with ICCPR, supra note 107, art. 7. 
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armed conflict.170 Third, some treaties distinguish between biological and 
medical experimentation.171 Finally, some treaties require human 
experimentation to cause death or seriously endanger the physical or mental 
health or integrity of the person.172 Despite their inclusion in several treaties, 
these provisions do not change the core elements of the definition. 
Significantly, these provisions only appear in international 
humanitarian law treaties; they do not appear in any human rights treaties. 
While the principle of lex specialis is sometimes used to apply the specific 
norms of humanitarian law over the general norms of human rights law in 
times of armed conflict, this approach is controversial.173 Even if the 
principle of lex specialis is accepted, it is inapplicable here. To begin with, 
there is no reasonable basis for suggesting that the standards regarding 
human experimentation should differ because such experimentation is 
committed during an armed conflict or in a particular type of armed 
conflict.174 There are no military, political, scientific, medical, or ethical 
reasons for making such distinctions. Even the negotiating records of the 
humanitarian law treaties fail to offer any meaningful justification for such 
distinctions. Neither the Nuremberg trials nor the Nuremberg Code contain 
distinctions regarding human experimentation conducted in times of peace 
or war or when conducted in international or non-international armed 
conflicts. Accordingly, it would be contrary to the historical record to offer 
different levels of protection to individuals based solely on the nature of the 
armed conflict or when it occurred. Moreover, the ICCPR’s prohibition on 
non-consensual human experimentation contains no temporal or contextual 
restrictions. It is absolute and allows for no derogation.175 While some human 
rights standards may be subject to derogation in times of national emergency, 
the prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation is not subject 
 
 170.  Compare Additional Protocol I, supra note 68, art. 11, with Additional Protocol II, supra note 
79, art. 5. 
 171.  Compare First Geneva Convention, supra note 55, art. 12, and Second Geneva Convention, 
supra note 55, art. 12, with Third Geneva Convention, supra note 60, art. 13, and Fourth Geneva 
Convention, supra note 60, art. 32. 
 172.  ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 88, art. 8(2)(b)(x)-2. 
 173.  See, e.g., Silvia Borelli, The (Mis)-Use of General Principles of Law: Lex Specialis and the 
Relationship between International Human Rights Law and the Laws of Armed Conflict, in GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW - THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 265 (Laura Pineschi ed., 2015); Marco Sassòli & 
Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 
Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 
90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 599, 600 (2008).  
 174.  See, e.g., Vivienne Nathanson, Medical Ethics in Peacetime and Wartime: The Case for a 
Better Understanding, 95 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 189 (2013); see also CHRISTINE BYRON, WAR CRIMES 
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 112 
(2009). 
 175.  ICCPR, supra note 107, art. 4. 
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to such derogation. It is an absolute prohibition. Finally, there is no 
meaningful distinction between biological and medical research. These 
terms are used interchangeably in the various treaties. 
The prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation does 
not require death or serious danger to the physical or mental health or 
integrity of the subject. The norm is primarily designed to protect human 
dignity and personal autonomy. Accordingly, the consequences of 
experimentation are simply not relevant for purposes of determining whether 
non-consensual human experimentation has occurred. It would be counter-
productive to include such a requirement because it would provide 
perpetrators with another way to justify experimentation. For example, 
perpetrators could argue that human experimentation did not violate 
international law because it did not kill or seriously endanger the subject, 
even if it caused significant pain and suffering. In fact, the Office of Legal 
Counsel raised this argument to justify the legality of enhanced interrogation 
techniques.176 Its position was that interrogation techniques only constitute 
torture if they caused pain that is “equivalent in intensity to the pain 
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of 
bodily function, or even death.”177  Not surprisingly, this argument has been 
roundly discredited.178 
A final consideration involves the relationship between non-consensual 
human experimentation and other international norms. Non-consensual 
human experimentation can be classified as a form of torture or other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.179 In fact, it appears along 
with torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment 
in Article 7 of the ICCPR.180 
 
 176.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office 
of Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel of the Cent. Intelligence Agency on the 
Interrogation of Al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002). 
 177.  Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2002). 
 178.  See David Cole, The Torture Memos: The Case Against the Lawyers, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, 
Oct. 8, 2009; JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 142–76 (2007); José E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175 
(2006). 
 179.  See U.N. General Assembly, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. A/63/175 (July 28, 2008) (discussing the inclusion 
of scientific or medical experimentation as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities). 
 180.  ICCPR, supra note 107, art. 7. 
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While it can be classified as a form of torture or other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment, non-consensual human experimentation is a distinct 
violation of international law. The travaux préparatoires for Article 7 of the 
ICCPR make this point clear. Non-consensual human experimentation was 
considered a unique harm that merited special recognition and specific 
condemnation. This assertion was made on several occasions throughout the 
diplomatic negotiations regarding Article 7. There is also a practical reason 
for considering the prohibition against non-consensual human 
experimentation as a distinct norm. While torture and other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment require the consent or acquiescence of a state actor, 
non-consensual human experimentation does not.181 This is evident from the 
historical record. The Nuremberg Code contained no requirement of state 
action for purposes of establishing non-consensual human experimentation. 
More recently, the Second Circuit did not require state action in the Pfizer 
case when it concluded that a private corporation could be liable for violating 
the prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation. 
This interpretation is also consistent with international humanitarian 
law, which classifies non-consensual human experimentation as a war crime 
and crime against humanity.182 It is well-established that these acts can be 
committed by non-state actors. The Nuremberg trials did not address state 
action as a necessary element for prosecuting acts of non-consensual human 
experimentation. In fact, one of the defendants in the Brandt case, Adolf 
Pokorny, was identified by the U.S. military tribunal as a “private physician 
who had no official connection with the governmental medical services.”183  
Pokorny was charged in the indictment with participating in criminal 
sterilization experiments, which constituted both war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.184 More recently, the Rome Statute identified non-
consensual human experimentation as a war crime, and civilians can be 
prosecuted for such acts.185 It would be puzzling to hold civilians responsible 
for committing non-consensual human experimentation in times of armed 
conflict but innocent of such acts in times of peace. 
Given the extraordinary level of international support against non-
consensual human experimentation, it is not surprising that slight variations 
may exist among the various sources. Notwithstanding, the three core 
 
 181.  Compare ICCPR, supra note 107, art. 7, with CAT, supra note 128, art. 1. 
 182.  See Michael A. Grodin, et al., Medicine and Human Rights: A Proposal for International 
Action, 23 HASTINGS CTR. RPT. 8 (Aug. 1993). 
 183.  Military Tribunal No.1, supra note 27, at 35.  
 184.  Pokorny was ultimately acquitted because the tribunal concluded the prosecution had failed to 
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  See id. at 695. 
 185.  Rome Statute, supra note 83, arts. 8(2)(a)(ii), 8(2)(b)(x), and 8(2)(e)(xi).  
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elements have found consistent support in international practice since the 
adoption of the Nuremberg Code. 
III. THE CIA RENDITION, DETENTION,  
AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM 
The role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the detention and 
interrogation of suspected terrorists was established soon after September 
11, 2001.186 The CIA’s actions would come to define the U.S. counter-
terrorism response. 
A. Using the Theory of Learned Helplessness to Develop the Interrogation          
Program 
Within days of the 9/11 attacks, the National Security Council met to 
discuss operations for capturing terrorist suspects around the world.187 On 
September 17, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a classified 
Memorandum of Notification (MON) authorizing the Director of Central 
Intelligence to “undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons 
who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons 
and interests or who are planning terrorist activities.”188 The MON “provided 
unprecedented authorities, granting the CIA significant discretion in 
determining whom to detain, the factual basis for the detention, and the 
length of the detention.”189 On October 8, 2001, the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, George Tenet, delegated the capture and detention 
authority set forth in the MON to James Pavitt, the CIA’s deputy director for 
operations, and Cofer Black, the CIA’s chief of the Counterterrorism Center 
(CTC).190 
Despite its new mandate, the CIA had relatively little experience 
interrogating detainees.191 Accordingly, the CIA looked to various external 
resources to assist in developing an interrogation program. In Fall 2001, the 
CIA requested two psychologists, James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, to write 
a paper on Al-Qaeda’s interrogation resistance methods.192 At the time, 
 
 186.  Portions of this section appeared in William J. Aceves, United States v. George Tenet: A 
Federal Indictment for Torture, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (2015). 
 187.  See RON SUSKIND, THE PRICE OF LOYALTY 186 (2004); BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 74–
92 (2002). 
 188.  SSCI REPORT, supra note 8, at 11 (Executive Summary). 
 189.  Id.; see also MAYER, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
 190.  SSCI REPORT, supra note 8, at 13 (Executive Summary). 
 191.  Declaration of Jose Rodriguez at 7, Salim v. Mitchell, CV-15-0286-JLQ (E.D. Wash. 2016) 
[hereinafter Rodriguez Declaration]. 
 192.  MITCHELL & HARLOW, supra note 14, at 51–58; SSCI REPORT, supra note 8, at 20–21. Mitchell 
and Jessen were referenced in the SSCI report by pseudonyms (Grayson Swigert and Hammond Dunbar).  
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Mitchell was working as an independent contractor for the CIA, and Jessen 
was employed by the Department of Defense (DOD). Both Mitchell and 
Jessen had experience working in the DOD’s Joint Personnel Recovery 
Agency, which was responsible for managing the military’s Survival 
Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE) training program.193 The U.S. Army, 
Navy, and Air Force use the SERE program to train military personnel on 
survival tactics in hostile territory.194 Mitchell and Jessen believed that 
various techniques used in the SERE program could be repurposed for use 
in an interrogation program for Al-Qaeda detainees.195 
In December 2001, Mitchell and Jessen submitted their paper, 
Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to Al-Qa’eda Resistance to 
Interrogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective, to the CIA.196 
The paper assessed an Al-Qaeda document known as the Manchester 
Manual, which purported to offer various strategies for resisting 
interrogations.197 Mitchell and Jessen assessed these strategies and 
considered ways of countering them through psychological assessment 
based on their experience training U.S. military personnel. In Spring 2002, 
Mitchell’s contract with the CIA was modified to reflect additional 
responsibilities, including providing psychological consultations to the CIA 
and making recommendations on interrogation methods.198 Jessen soon 
resigned his DOD position and began working with Mitchell as an 
independent contractor for the CIA.199 
In July 2002, Mitchell met with several CIA officials to discuss 
interrogation techniques that could be used against Al-Qaeda detainees.200 
At this meeting, Mitchell suggested the possibility of using interrogation 
techniques that were used in the SERE program. He indicated that the goal 
in using these techniques would be to “dislocate the subject’s expectations 
and overcome his resistance and thereby motivate him to provide the 
 
 193.  MITCHELL & HARLOW, supra note 14, at 44. 
 194.  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NO. 1300.21, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS (2001), 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130021p.pdf. 
 195.  MITCHELL & HARLOW, supra note 14, at 10, 42–49. 
 196.  [Redacted], Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to Al Qaeda Resistance to 
Interrogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective (2001). The majority of this paper is 
classified.  Brief excerpts were subsequently disclosed in an April 2002 cable. See Subject: Eyes Only – 
Countermeasures to Al-Qa’ida Resistance to [redacted] (Apr. 12, 2002). 
 197.  MITCHELL & HARLOW, supra note 14, at 11. 
 198.  Rodriguez Declaration, supra note 191, at 3. 
 199.  Declaration of John “Bruce” Jessen in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 2, Salim v. Mitchell, CV-15-0286-JLQ (E.D. Wash. 2016). 
 200.  Rodriguez Declaration, supra note 191, at 6. At the time of this meeting, Rodriguez served as 
the Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, which is a division of the CIA’s National Clandestine 
Service. Id. at 1.  
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information . . . .”201 This process could produce “a range of mental states in 
the subject, including, but not limited to, fear, learned helplessness, 
compliancy, or false hope.”202 Subsequently, Mitchell and Jessen identified 
a series of specialized interrogation techniques that could be used against Al-
Qaeda detainees to achieve learned helplessness.203 These techniques were 
the subject of extensive discussions within the CIA and were addressed at a 
follow-up meeting on July 8, 2002.204 Eventually, Mitchell and Jessen 
proposed ten “enhanced interrogation techniques” to the CIA for review and 
approval.205 
• The attention grasp consists of grasping the detainee with both 
hands, with one hand on each side of the collar opening, in a 
controlled and quick motion. In the same motion as the grasp, the 
detainee is drawn toward the interrogator. 
• During the walling technique, the detainee is pulled forward and 
then quickly and firmly pushed into a flexible false wall so that his 
shoulder blades hit the wall. His head and neck are supported with 
a rolled towel to prevent whiplash. 
• The facial hold is used to hold the detainee’s head immobile. The 
interrogator places an open palm on either side of the detainee’s 
face and the interrogator’s fingertips are kept well away from the 
detainee’s eyes. 
• With the facial or insult slap, the fingers are slightly spread apart. 
The interrogator's hand makes contact with the area between the tip 
of the detainee's chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe. 
• In cramped confinement, the detainee is placed in a confined 
space, typically a small or large box, which is usually dark. 
Confinement in the smaller space lasts no more than two hours and 
in the larger space it can last up to 18 hours. 
• Insects placed in a confinement box involve placing a harmless 
insect in the box with the detainee. 
• During wall standing, the detainee may stand about 4 to 5 feet 
from a wall with his feet spread approximately to his shoulder 
width. His arms are stretched out in front of him and his fingers rest 
on the wall to support all of his body weight. The detainee is not 
allowed to reposition his hands or feet. 
• The application of stress positions may include having the 
detainee sit on the floor with his legs extended straight out in front 
of him with his arms raised above his head or kneeling on the floor 
 
 201.  Id. at 6. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  MITCHELL & HARLOW, supra note 14, at 46. 
 204.  Cable from [redacted] to [redacted], Subject: Eyes Only – Increased Pressure in the Next Phase 
of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogations (July 8, 2002). 
 205.  MITCHELL & HARLOW, supra note 14, at 52–53; see also Memorandum from [redacted] to 
[redacted], Subject: Description of Physical Pressures (July 9, 2002). 
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while leaning back at a 45 degree angle. 
• Sleep deprivation will not exceed 11 days at a time. 
• The application of the waterboard technique involves binding the 
detainee to a bench with his feet elevated above his head. The 
detainee’s head is immobilized and an interrogator places a cloth 
over the detainee’s mouth and nose while pouring water onto the 
cloth in a controlled manner. Airflow is restricted for 20 to 40 
seconds, and the technique produces the sensation of drowning and 
suffocation.206 
According to Mitchell, these ten techniques “would lend themselves to 
a Pavlovian process” that would condition compliance from detainees.207 
These techniques were eventually approved by the CIA.208 While they were 
not considered “enhanced interrogation techniques,” several other 
techniques were also proposed for use against detainees, including solitary 
confinement, water dousing, dietary manipulation, sensory deprivation, 
environmental manipulation, and forced nudity.209 
Mitchell has indicated the CIA interrogation program was 
“psychologically based.”210 Specifically, it consisted of two distinct 
“naturally occurring learning processes.”211 The first process was known as 
classical conditioning and required “detainees to experience fear and 
emotional discomfort when they thought about being deceitful.”212 To 
achieve this, the interrogation program had to “pair the naturally occurring 
discomfort and distress of the EITs [enhanced interrogation techniques] with 
the urge to deceive.”213 The second process was called avoidance 
conditioning and required “detainees to experience a sense of relief when 
they cooperated.”214 
To succeed, precise timing was essential to the interrogation program. 
Mitchell noted that “[o]verusing or underusing EITs or using them at the 
 
 206.  INSPECTOR GENERAL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SPECIAL REVIEW: 
COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (SEPTEMBER 2001 – OCTOBER 2003) 
15 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 207.  MITCHELL & HARLOW, supra note 14, at 56. 
 208.  Mitchell and Jessen had also proposed two other techniques that were not designated as 
enhanced interrogation techniques: the use of diapers on detainees and mock burials. Memorandum from 
[redacted] to [redacted], Subject: Description of Physical Pressures (July 9, 2002). However, many 
detainees were eventually placed in diapers. 
 209.  CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SUPPORT TO DETAINEE RENDITION, INTERROGATION, AND DETENTION 8 (Dec. 2004). 
 210.  MITCHELL & HARLOW, supra note 14, at 45–46. 
 211.  Id. at 153. 
 212.  Id.  
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. at 154. 
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wrong time disrupted conditioning for the desired response.”215 This became 
evident after the enhanced interrogation techniques had been used on various 
detainees. As the program developed, Mitchell and Jessen also discovered 
that conditioning could occur even without the actual use of enhanced 
interrogation techniques. Detainees began associating certain objects with 
the enhanced interrogation techniques. They soon became conditioned to be 
fearful and compliant at the sight of these objects. For example, a towel was 
often used by interrogators to “wall” detainees by slamming them against 
flexible walls that were placed in interrogation rooms. This resulted in 
detainees associating a towel with the walling technique. “We took 
advantage of this learning phenomenon to create an opportunity to use fewer 
EITs later by making the rolled-up towel we used to protect the detainees 
during walling an object that evoked fear.”216 
According to a subsequent CIA background paper on interrogation 
techniques, Al-Qaeda detainees were well trained and able to resist standard 
interrogation techniques.217 Accordingly, the interrogation process needed to 
overwhelm the detainee’s resistance. “Effective interrogation is based on the 
concept of using both physical and psychological pressures in a 
comprehensive, systematic, and cumulative manner to influence HVD [high-
value detainee] behavior, to overcome a detainee’s resistance posture.”218 
Thus, the goal of interrogation “is to create a state of learned helplessness 
and dependence conducive to the collection of intelligence in a predictable, 
reliable, and sustainable manner.”219 Interrogation techniques were divided 
into three categories: conditioning, corrective, and coercive techniques. 
Conditioning techniques set the baseline level of treatment “to demonstrate 
to the HVD that he has no control over basic human needs.”220 These 
techniques included forced nudity, sleep deprivation, and dietary 
manipulation.221 Corrective techniques were used “to correct, startle, or to 
achieve another enabling objective with the detainee.”222 These techniques 
included the insult slap, abdominal slap, facial hold, and attention grasp.223 
Finally, coercive techniques placed the detainee in more physical and 
psychological stress. These techniques included walling, water dousing, 
 
 215.  Id.  
 216.  Id. at 157. 
 217.  CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BACKGROUND PAPER ON CIA’S COMBINED USE OF 
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 1, 17 (2004).  
 218.  Id. at 1. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. at 4. 
 221.  Id. at 5. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 217, at 5. 
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stress positions, wall standing, and cramped confinement.224 In addition to 
these interrogation techniques, detainees were exposed to white noise, loud 
sounds, and constant light during the interrogation process.225 
B. Implementing the Interrogation Program: The Study of Abu Zubaydah 
The theory of learned helplessness was first tested on Abu Zubaydah at 
the CIA’s black site in Thailand.226 At the time, Zubaydah was believed to 
be a high-ranking Al-Qaeda official with extensive knowledge of Al-Qaeda 
operations.227 After Zubaydah was stabilized from injuries suffered during 
his capture, he was transferred from Pakistan to a CIA detention facility in 
Thailand where he received further medical treatment.228 He was initially 
interrogated by FBI officers, but interrogation authority was soon transferred 
exclusively to the CIA.229 According to Tenet, “[i]t was at this point that we 
got into holding and interrogating high-value detainees—‘HVDs,’ as we 
called them—in a serious way.”230 As the CIA finalized its interrogation 
plans, Zubaydah was held in isolation for several weeks.231 
On August 4, 2002, the CIA began using enhanced interrogation 
techniques on Zubaydah.232 Mitchell and Jessen played a primary role in 
Zubaydah’s interrogation. In fact, they personally subjected Zubaydah to 
various enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding.233 The 
following account describes Zubaydah’s first interrogation session. 
At 1150 hours security personnel went into the cell and shackled and 
hooded subject and removed subject’s towel. When this was accomplished 
IC SERE psychologist (ICSP) entered the cell. IC SERE psychologist 
placed a rolled towel behind subject’s neck and backed subject up to the 
cell wall. The IC SERE psychologist removed subject’s hood. Performed 
an attention grab and had subject watch while the large confinement box 
was brought into the cell and laid on the floor. The IC SERE psychologist 
 
 224.  Id. at 7–8. 
 225.  Id. at 4. 
 226.  SSCI REPORT, supra note 8, at 40–47. 
 227.  Subsequent accounts have made clear that Zubaydah was not a member of Al Qaeda. See 
Charlie R. Church, What Politics and the Media Still Get Wrong About Abu Zubaydah, LAWFARE, Aug. 
1, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-politics-and-media-still-get-wrong-about-abu-zubaydah.  
 228.  SSCI REPORT, supra note 8, at 27. 
 229.  See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE 
FBI’S INVOLVEMENT IN AND OBSERVATIONS OF DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN GUANTANAMO BAY, 
AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ (2009). 
 230.  TENET, supra note 8, at 241. 
 231.  SSCI REPORT, supra note 8, at 27–30. 
 232.  Id. at 40. 
 233.  Jessen Dep. at 148, January 20, 2017, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 
2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ); Defs.’ Answer and Affirm. Defenses, at 16, June 21, 2016, Salim v. 
Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ).   
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then demanded that subject, per REF B guidance, provide detailed and 
verifiable information on operations planned against the U.S., to include 
names, phones [sic] numbers, email addresses, weapons caches, and 
safehouses of anyone supporting terrorist operations in the U.S. 
. . . 
Subject appeared apprehensive. Subject said he had already provided the 
required information and denied having additional information. Subject 
received insult slap and face grab at each point that he denied having 
additional information. As his denials were expected, subject was again 
hooded while security officers stood the box upright and secured it to the 
cell bars. Subject was backed into the box and provided the container for 
his waste, water, and toilet paper. Subject’s hood was removed and he was 
told this was his new home until he was prepared to provide detained and 
verifiable information on operations planned against the U.S. This verbal 
demand serves as a bridge to the next session of interrogation and is what 
subject is left to think about during his confinement. Subject was then shut 
into the large confinement box. The first session lasted approximately ten 
minutes.234 
The CIA recorded several of these interrogation sessions.235 The videos 
showed Zubaydah being subjected to various interrogation techniques, 
including waterboarding.236 These recordings were later destroyed at the 
request of Jose Rodriguez, the Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism 
Center.237 The destruction of the recordings would lead to an internal 
investigation although no charges were ever filed.238 
Zubaydah was subjected to enhanced interrogation methods for 
nineteen consecutive days.  During this time, he “spent a total of 266 hours 
(11 days, 2 hours) in the large (coffin size) confinement box and 29 hours in 
the small confinement box, which had a width of 21 inches, a depth of 2.5 
feet, and a height of 2.5 feet.”239 Zubaydah was told “the only way he would 
leave the facility was in the coffin-shaped confinement box.”240 During his 
interrogation sessions, Zubaydah often became “hysterical” and he 
frequently “cried,” “begged,” “pleaded,” and “whimpered.”241 After one 
waterboarding session, Zubaydah became unresponsive, “with bubbles 
 
 234.  Cable from [redacted] to [redacted], Subject: Eyes Only – Details re Initial Cycle of 
Interrogations of 04 August 02 of Abu Zubaydah 2–3 (Aug. 4, 2002) (on file with The Torture Database), 
https://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/28_0.pdf. 
 235.  SSCI REPORT, supra note 8, at 43–45. 
 236.  Id. at 44. 
 237.  See RODRIGUEZ, supra note 8, at 181–218. 
 238.  Mark Mazzetti & Charlie Savage, No Criminal Charges Sought Over C.I.A. Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 2010, at A12. 
 239.   SSCI REPORT, supra note 8, at 42. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. at 42–43.  The interrogation sessions also had a profound impact on CIA personnel. Id. at 
44–45. 
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rising through his open, full mouth” and required medical intervention to 
regain consciousness.242 
After nineteen days of subjecting Zubaydah to enhanced interrogation 
techniques, the CIA concluded the program had been successful. According 
to the interrogation team, “we have successfully broken subject’s willingness 
to withhold threat and intelligence information. He is presently in a state of 
complete subjugation and total compliance.”243 The interrogation team did 
not believe Zubaydah had any specific threat information. While such 
conclusions could never be definitive, the interrogation team was confident 
that Zubaydah had revealed all available and relevant information.244 
Zubaydah remained in CIA custody for four years.245  He was detained 
at CIA facilities in Afghanistan, Thailand, and Poland. On September 5, 
2006, Zubaydah was transferred to Guantanamo and placed in DOD custody. 
In a March 2007 appearance before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal at 
Guantanamo, Zubaydah described his treatment by the CIA as torture.246 
From October 6 through 11, 2006, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) was allowed to visit the U.S. detention facilities at 
Guantanamo.247 During the visit, the ICRC met with government personnel 
and toured the facilities. In addition, they met privately with several 
detainees. Following the visit, the ICRC prepared a confidential report 
(ICRC Report) on the detention of 14 high-value detainees. The ICRC 
Report was based on private interviews conducted with the detainees. The 
report was submitted to the United States on February 14, 2007.248 
 
 242.  Id. at 43–44. 
 243.  Cable from [redacted] to ALEC, Subject: Eyes Only – Status of the Aggressive Interrogation 
Phase; Transition Into Maintenance and Long Term Debriefing, at 1, (Aug. 23, 2002), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/80-5._exhibit_e.pdf. 
 244.  Id. at 2. 
 245.  Zubaydah’s presence in the CIA’s RDI Program was publicly revealed on December 26, 2002.  
See Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; ‘Stress and Duress’ 
Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at 
A1. 
 246.  Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10016, 22–27 
(Mar. 27, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/safefree/csrt_abuzubaydah.pdf. Large 
portions of Zubaydah’s testimony, including descriptions of specific interrogation techniques, were 
redacted. 
 247.  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ICRC REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF FOURTEEN “HIGH 
VALUE DETAINEES” IN CIA CUSTODY, 3 (Feb. 14, 2007) [hereinafter ICRC REPORT]. The ICRC Report 
was confidential and was not supposed to be released without the approval of the ICRC. Id. at 1. 
 248.  Letter from Geoff Loane, Head of Regional Delegation, International Committee of the Red 
Cross to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (Feb. 14, 2007) (on file with 
The New York Review of Books), https://www.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf. 
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Each detainee interviewed by the ICRC had been in CIA custody prior 
to their transfer to Guantanamo.249 They were interviewed separately and 
outside the presence of U.S. government officials. The ICRC noted the 
similar stories offered by each detainee with respect to their capture, 
detention, and treatment. Indeed, “the consistency of the detailed allegations 
provided separately by each of the fourteen adds particular weight to the 
information provided . . . .”250 Each of the detainees was subjected to solitary 
confinement and incommunicado detention.251 The ICRC identified several 
additional forms of ill treatment, including suffocation by water, prolonged 
stress standing positions, beatings by use of a collar, beating and kicking, 
confinement in a box, prolonged nudity, sleep deprivation, exposure to cold 
temperature, prolonged shackling, threats of ill-treatment, forced shaving, 
and deprivation/restriction of solid food.252 The detainees were also deprived 
of open air, exercise, and appropriate hygiene facilities, and their access to 
the Qur’an was restricted.253 
The ICRC Report provides details regarding the treatment of several 
detainees, including Abu Zubaydah.254 Verbatim transcripts of the ICRC 
interview with Zubaydah corroborate the descriptions provided in the SSCI 
Report.255 Zubaydah described being slapped repeatedly in the face, 
slammed against the walls of his detention room, placed in a small wooden 
box, forced into stress positions, and being waterboarded.256 According to 
Zubaydah, “I was told during this period that I was one of the first to receive 
these interrogation techniques, so no rules applied. It felt like they were 
experimenting and trying out techniques to be used later on other people.”257 
The ICRC stated in its report that the forms of mistreatment suffered by 
the detainees, both in isolation and in combination, amounted to torture as 
well as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.258 The ICRC also found that 
the CIA detention program “amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
and enforced disappearance, in contravention of international law.”259 More 
broadly, the ICRC expressed great concern with the coordinated and 
 
 249.  ICRC REPORT, supra note 247, at 4. 
 250.  Id. at 5. 
 251.  Id. at 7. 
 252.  Id. at 8–9. 
 253.  Id. at 9. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Verbatim transcripts of these interviews were provided in Annex I to the ICRC Report. ICRC 
REPORT, supra note 247, at 28–37. 
 256.  Id. at 29–31. 
 257.  Id. at 31. 
 258.  Id. at 5, 24. 
 259.  Id. at 24. 
ACEVES_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  9:05 AM 
84 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 29:41 
systematic nature of the detention program. “When understood in their 
totality, the undisclosed detention regime to which these persons were 
subjected becomes all the more disturbing.”260 
Concerns with the RDI Program were also voiced within the CIA. 
Indeed, personnel in the CIA’s Office of Medical Services (OMS) expressed 
concern that non-consensual human experimentation was occurring and that 
OMS may be implicated in such acts. For example, OMS Guidelines 
required OMS personnel to collect and analyze data from interrogation 
sessions “[i]n order to best inform future medical judgments and 
recommendations.”261 And yet, some OMS personnel expressed concerns 
“that studying the results of CIA interrogations would amount to human 
experimentation.”262 Two senior CIA officers who conducted an operational 
assessment of the RDI Program expressed similar concerns. They argued it 
would not be possible to assess the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced 
interrogation techniques without violating the “Federal Policy for the 
Protection of Human Subjects.”263 
It is unclear how many individuals the CIA detained as part of the RDI 
Program. The SSCI Report indicated the CIA detained at least 119 
individuals although an accurate count was simply not possible because 
some CIA records remained classified and other records are unclear.264 
Detainees were held in several locations throughout the world, designated by 
the SSCI Report as Detention Sites Cobalt (Afghanistan), Grey 
(Afghanistan), Brown (Afghanistan), Orange (Afghanistan), Blue (Poland), 
Green (Thailand), Black (Romania), and Violet (Lithuania).265 The majority 
of detainees were held at Detention Site Cobalt (also known as the Salt Pit), 
which was located outside of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. According to 
the SSCI Report, 39 of the 119 detainees were subjected to enhanced 
interrogation techniques.266 Of the 39 detainees, 17 of them were subjected 
to enhanced interrogations between January 2003 and August 2003.267 
 
 260.  Id. at 5. 
 261.  OMS Guidelines, supra note 209, at 20. 
 262.  SSCI REPORT, supra note 8, at 126. 
 263.  Id. at xxii. 
 264.  Id. at 14. According to a July 20, 2007 memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, the 
CIA had custody of ninety-eight detainees between March 2003 and July 2007. The memorandum 
indicated that the CIA had used “enhanced techniques” on approximately thirty detainees.  Memorandum 
from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to John A. Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, 
Central Intelligence Agency 5 (July 20, 2007). 
 265.  SSCI REPORT, supra note 8, at 57, 61, 97. 
 266.  Id. at 96. 
 267.  Report of the SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM: FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS, S. REP. NO. 113–288, at 12 (2014) [hereinafter SSCI II REPORT]. 
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By the time Mitchell and Jessen had completed their work for the CIA, 
their private consulting company had been paid over $81 million.268 
Individually, they had each been paid well over $1.2 million for their 
services. In addition, their contracts with the CIA included an 
indemnification agreement that would cover expenses associated with any 
potential civil or criminal prosecutions.269 
IV. SUING THE ARCHITECTS  
OF THE INTERROGATION PROGRAM 
Since 9/11, several victims of the RDI Program have filed lawsuits 
seeking to hold the United States accountable for their wrongful detention 
and mistreatment. Each lawsuit was dismissed on procedural grounds.270 But 
the Salim litigation would be different. 
A. Salim v. Mitchell 
On October 13, 2015, two individuals (Suleiman Abdullah Salim and 
Mohamed Ahmed Ben Soud) who had been subjected to CIA detention and 
interrogation and the personal representative of a third individual (Gul 
Rahman) who had died while being subjected to similar treatment filed a 
civil lawsuit in federal district court for the Eastern District of Washington 
against Mitchell and Jessen.271 According to the complaint, the plaintiffs 
were subjected to aggressive interrogation techniques.272 
Plaintiffs Suleiman Abdullah Salim and Mohamed Ahmed Ben Soud were 
kidnapped by the CIA and tortured and experimented upon in accordance 
with Defendants’ protocols. They were subjected to solitary confinement; 
extreme darkness, cold, and noise; repeated beatings; starvation; 
 
 268.  Memorandum from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CIA COMMENTS ON THE SENATE 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON THE RENDITION, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION 
PROGRAM 49 (June 2013). In 2005, Mitchell and Jessen formed a private company, Mitchell, Jessen, and 
Associates, which provided various services to the CIA, including consulting, security, and interrogation 
services. 
 269.  Exhibit 2 to Notice of Filing of Defendants’ Contracts and Nondisclosure Agreements at 6, 
Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ). 
 270.  See, e.g., William J. Aceves, Constitutional Barriers and the Perils of Impunity, in LESSONS 
AND LEGACIES OF THE WAR ON TERROR 49, 52 (Gershon Shafir et al. eds., 2013). 
 271.  Complaint, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-
JLQ). The plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and several private 
attorneys. See Sheri Fink & James Risen, Psychologists Open a Window on Brutal C.I.A. Interrogations, 
N.Y. TIMES, (June 21, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2sR3niN.  
 272.  At the outset of the litigation, the ACLU sent a letter to Attorney General Loretta Lynch 
requesting that the United States not intervene in the litigation. See Letter from Steven R. Shapiro, ACLU 
Legal Director, to The Hon. Loretta Lynch, Att’y Gen. (Nov. 5, 2015). While the United States was not 
a party to the litigation, it did participate in several proceedings in order to protect the confidentiality of 
various documents. See, e.g., Statement of Int. of the United States, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 
1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ).  
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excruciatingly painful stress positions; prolonged sleep deprivation; 
confinement in coffin-like boxes; and water torture. Plaintiffs Salim and 
Ben Soud suffered lasting psychological and physical damage from this 
torture. Gul Rahman was tortured in many of the same ways, including 
after Defendant Jessen trained and supervised CIA personnel to apply 
these methods.  Shortly after that training, Mr. Rahman died as a result of 
hypothermia caused by his exposure to extreme cold, exacerbated by 
dehydration, lack of food, and his immobility in a stress position. His 
family has never been officially notified of his death and his body never 
returned to them.273 
The complaint asserted jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute and 
raised three causes of action: torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment, war crimes, and non-consensual human experimentation.274 The 
complaint alleged that Mitchell and Jessen had designed the CIA’s 
interrogation program by relying “on experiments from the 1960s in which 
researchers taught dogs ‘helplessness’ by subjecting them to uncontrollable 
pain.”275 With respect to the claim of non-consensual human 
experimentation, the complaint asserted the defendants pursued a theory 
“that prisoners could be reduced through abusive treatment to a state of 
‘learned helplessness’ and thereby rendered passive, compliant, and unable 
to resist their interrogators’ demands for information.”276 The complaint 
further alleged Mitchell and Jessen developed a set of techniques to 
condition the detainees and achieve learned helplessness.277 To determine 
whether the interrogation techniques were effective, the defendants had to 
assess them in a systematic manner. 
Defendants implemented an experimental protocol that required 
assessments of whether (1) prisoners had been tortured long enough to 
induce a state of “learned helplessness” or additional torture was 
necessary; (2) certain combinations and sequences of torture techniques 
were most effective at overcoming “resistance”; and (3) whether detainees 
became fully compliant with interrogators’ demands once they had been 
reduced to a state of learned helplessness.278 
The plaintiffs raised several distinct theories of liability. According to 
the complaint, Mitchell and Jessen were directly liable because they engaged 
in non-consensual human experimentation by seeking to induce a state of 
learned helplessness on the plaintiffs. “Defendants monitored, recalibrated, 
 
     273.    Complaint, Salim v. Mitchell, supra note 271, at 2–3. 
 274.  The Alien Tort Statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and provides the district courts with 
original jurisdiction for any civil action by an alien for a tort only committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States. 
 275.  Complaint, Salim v. Mitchell, supra note 271, at 2. 
 276.  Id. at 75. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. at 75–76. 
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and refined their experiment based on their assessment of Plaintiffs’ and 
other prisoners’ physical and psychological reactions to torture and cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment.”279 In addition, the complaint alleged 
Mitchell and Jessen were liable because they conspired with the United 
States and aided and abetted the United States in experimenting on the 
plaintiffs without their consent.280 
In January 2016, Mitchell and Jessen filed a motion to dismiss, raising 
three challenges to the lawsuit.281 First, they argued the lawsuit should be 
dismissed pursuant to the political question doctrine because the lawsuit 
involved decisions of the political branches and the issues in the case lacked 
any judicially manageable standards.282 Second, they argued they were 
entitled to derivative sovereign immunity because they were performing 
work on behalf of the U.S. government.283 Third, they argued the plaintiffs 
had failed to allege proper claims under the Alien Tort Statute.284 They 
asserted the complaint failed to meet the standard for ATS cases set forth by 
the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. because the 
claims did not “touch and concern” the United States with sufficient force to 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.285 With respect to the 
claim of non-consensual human experimentation, Mitchell and Jessen 
asserted this norm was not specific, universal, or obligatory as required for 
ATS litigation.286 They argued the norm was not specific because “the 
parameters of what constitutes non-consensual human [medical] 
experimentation are not defined.”287 They argued it was not sufficiently 
universal because violations of the norm “do not threaten serious 
consequences in international affairs.”288 And, they argued it was not 
obligatory “because the prohibition is not enshrined in international treaties 
or custom.”289 Finally, Mitchell and Jessen asserted their actions could not 
 
 279.  Id. at 76. 
 280.  Id. at 76–77. 
 281.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (Jan. 8, 2016), Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-
15-0286-JLQ) [hereinafter Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss]. 
 282.  Id. at 3–10. 
 283.  Id. at 10–21. 
 284.  Id. at 21–29. The Defendants also alleged that Obaid Ullah, as the personal representative of 
Gul Rahman, lacked the capacity to sue them. Id. at 29–30.  
 285.  Id. at 21–23; see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659 (2013). 
 286.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 281, at 27; see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 
692 (2004). 
 287.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 281, at 27. 
 288.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 289.  Id. 
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be “characterized as either ‘experimentation’ or ‘medical’ in nature.”290 They 
alleged that the enhanced interrogation program could not be classified as 
experimentation because it was based on the SERE program, which they had 
worked on for several years. They also noted that the plaintiffs had not even 
referred to the interrogation program as “medical” in nature. 
In response, the plaintiffs argued their claims of detainee abuse were 
not unreviewable political decisions and judicially manageable standards 
were available to assess their claims.291 Indeed, they noted both the Supreme 
Court and Ninth Circuit had recognized the limited reach of the political 
question doctrine and that claims of detainee abuse fell within the judicial 
mandate.292 The plaintiffs also argued the defendants were not entitled to 
derivative sovereign immunity because the government could not delegate 
the authority to commit detainee abuse and because the defendants had 
ample discretion in their contractual obligations.293 In addition, the plaintiffs 
pointed out there was no historical precedent for granting psychologists 
immunity in such cases.294 Moreover, the defendants were on notice that 
torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and non-consensual human 
experimentation were prohibited by international law.295 
With respect to the status of non-consensual human experimentation 
under international law, the plaintiffs asserted the norm is well-
established.296 Significantly, the norm against non-consensual human 
experimentation had already been considered and affirmed in Abdullahi v. 
Pfizer, Inc.297 The plaintiffs also argued the defendants did, in fact, engage 
in experimentation through their use of the theory of learned helplessness on 
detainees and their ongoing refinement of the interrogation program.298 And, 
finally, the plaintiffs argued the prohibition against non-consensual human 
experimentation is not limited to medical experiments. It can apply to 
scientific or biological experimentation.299 
On April 28, 2016, the district court issued its decision in Salim v. 
Mitchell rejecting each of the defendants’ arguments.300 The court declined 
 
 290.  Id. at 28–29.  
 291.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 3–10 (Feb. 11, 
2016), Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ). 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Id. at 10–16. 
 294.  Id. at 16–17. 
 295.  Id. at 17–19. 
 296.  Id. at 27–28. 
 297.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 291, at 27. 
 298.  Id. at 28. 
 299.  Id. at 29. 
 300.  Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016).  
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to dismiss the lawsuit pursuant to the political question doctrine, finding that 
executive branch actions are not immune from judicial review and that 
manageable standards did exist for considering the claims in the lawsuit.301  
In addition, the court declined to grant the defendants derivative sovereign 
immunity because courts narrowly construe such immunity for federal 
contractors, and it is inapplicable if the “contractor ‘exceeded his authority’” 
or such “‘governmental authority was not validly conferred.’”302 The court 
highlighted the defendants’ actions in designing and implementing the 
torture program, which included proposing the theory of learned 
helplessness and convincing the government that specific interrogation 
techniques, including waterboarding, would be successful.303 
In its analysis of the ATS claims, the district court held that the 
plaintiffs’ claims fulfilled the extraterritoriality standard enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Kiobel. The court determined the plaintiffs’ allegations, 
which highlighted the defendants’ U.S. citizenship and the defendants’ 
development and supervision of the interrogation program in the United 
States, were sufficient to meet the “touch and concern” standard.304 With 
respect to the substantive claims, the court did not specifically address the 
prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation. Rather, it 
acknowledged the plaintiffs’ claims of torture were sufficient to state a claim 
under the ATS.305 
In Fall 2016, the defendants filed a second motion to dismiss asserting 
the Military Commissions Act (MCA) deprived the district court of 
jurisdiction.306 While the MCA did impose jurisdictional limits in cases 
involving designated enemy combatants, the district court concluded that 
none of the plaintiffs had been designated as enemy combatants.307 Since the 
MCA was inapplicable to the plaintiffs, the district court rejected the motion 
to dismiss on January 17, 2017.308 
In Summer 2017, the defendants renewed their efforts to dismiss the 
lawsuit by filing a motion for summary judgment.309 Repeating their earlier 
 
 301.  Id. at 1127–30. 
 302.  Id. at 1130 (quoting Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez, 136 U.S. 663, 672–73 (2016)). 
 303.  Id. 
 304.  Id. at 1132. 
 305.  Id. at 1132–33. The district court also rejected the defendants’ challenge to Obaid Ullah’s 
capacity to sue. Id. at 1133. 
 306.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 
2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2). 
 307.  Salim v. Mitchell, No. CV-15-0286-JLQ, 2017 WL 390270, at *7 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2017). 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  See Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. 
Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ).  
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challenges, they argued the lawsuit should be dismissed pursuant to the 
political question doctrine and that they were entitled to derivative sovereign 
immunity.310 They also challenged the district court’s jurisdiction under the 
Alien Tort Statute. They again asserted the ATS did not apply 
extraterritorially.311 They also argued they could not be liable for the 
underlying claims under any applicable theory of liability, including direct 
liability, aiding and abetting liability, conspiracy, or joint criminal 
enterprise.312 The plaintiffs filed their own separate motion for partial 
summary judgment on their claim that they were subjected to torture and 
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and that the defendants aided 
and abetted in these acts.313 Both parties submitted expert declarations 
examining the status of non-consensual human experimentation under 
international law. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Professor Kevin Heller 
examined various international sources and concluded that “the Defendants’ 
actions clearly violated all three aspects of the customary international law 
prohibition concerning human experimentation: (1) under IHL [international 
humanitarian law]; (2) under the law of war crimes; and (3) under 
international human rights law.”314 On behalf of the defendants, Professor 
Julian Ku asserted there is no “clear and universal prohibition on human 
experimentation sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the ATS arising out 
of the only body of customary international law applicable to the defendants’ 
alleged conduct: the law governing non-international armed conflicts.”315 
On August 7, 2017, the district court rejected the defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment as well as the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary 
judgment.316 The court reiterated that the nature of the case did not compel 
dismissal under the political question doctrine.317 The court also reiterated 
 
 310.  Id. at 2. The defendants also sought to exclude the SSCI Report by alleging it was hearsay and, 
therefore, inadmissible. 
 311.  Id. at 21–23. 
 312.  See id. at 24–35. 
 313.  Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 
(E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ). 
 314.  Declaration of Kevin Jon Heller in Support of Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion for 
Summary Judgement at 24, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-
0286-JLQ); Expert Opinion of Kevin John Heller, at 24, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. 
Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ); Rebuttal Opinion of Kevin Jon Heller, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. 
Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ). 
 315.  Expert Opinion of Professor Julian Ku at 14-15, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. 
Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ); Sur-Rebuttal Opinion of Professor Julian Ku, Salim v. Mitchell, 
183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ). 
 316.  Salim v. Mitchell, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1161 (E.D. Wash. 2017). The court also rejected the 
Defendants’ motion to exclude the SSCI Report. Id.  
 317.  Id. at 1145–1147. 
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the defendants were not entitled to derivative sovereign immunity because 
they had not established that “they merely acted at the direction of the 
Government, within the scope of their authority, and that such authority was 
legally and validly conferred.”318 With respect to the merits of the underlying 
claims, the district court again declined to specifically address the 
prohibition against non-consensual human experimentation. Rather, the 
district court acknowledged that a number of factual and legal issues 
remained in dispute. For example, the court noted the actus reus and mens 
rea requirements for aiding and abetting liability had not been conclusively 
resolved by the Ninth Circuit.319 Moreover, the court determined that aiding 
and abetting liability “will also turn on whether the EITs [enhanced 
interrogation techniques] constituted ‘torture.’”320 Accordingly, summary 
judgment was inappropriate. 
In preparing for trial, the plaintiffs compiled a proposed set of jury 
instructions addressing many of the legal issues that would be considered at 
trial. With respect to non-consensual human experimentation, the proposed 
jury instructions indicated that this norm “derives from the international 
response to experiments conducted by Nazi doctors, which were universally 
condemned as a violation of basic human rights and civilized morality.”321 
The proposed instructions then identified five elements to the claim of non-
consensual human experimentation: (1) the plaintiff was a human subject of 
research involving an intervention or interaction with him; (2) the research 
was not carried out for his physical or mental health; (3) the research 
seriously endangered his physical or mental health; (4) the research was 
performed on him without his informed consent; and (5) the perpetrator acted 
under color of law or in concert with the state.322 Research was defined as 
“an attempt to answer a question by collecting data or information, analyzing 
the data or information, and drawing conclusions from the results in an 
attempt to contribute to generalizable knowledge.”323 In support, the 
plaintiffs cited numerous sources, including the Nuremberg trials, the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols I and II, the Rome Statute, the 
work of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, and several federal cases and 
statutes.324 
 
 318.  Id. at 1150. 
 319.  See id. at 1155. 
 320.  Id. at 1157. 
 321.  Plaintiffs’ Proposed Jury Instructions in Accordance with LR 51.1 at 50, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 
F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ). 
 322.  Id. at 51–53. 
 323.  Id. at 55. 
 324.  Id. at 51–53. 
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The defendants proposed a different set of jury instructions. While the 
defendants continued to argue that the prohibition against non-consensual 
human experimentation was not sufficiently well-defined for purposes of the 
ATS, they offered a three-part definition for the jury to consider when it was 
assessing this claim. To find the defendants liable, the jury would have to 
establish: (1) the CIA subjected the plaintiffs (or Gul Rahman) to medical or 
scientific experiments; (2) the experiments endangered the plaintiffs’ (or Gul 
Rahman’s) physical or mental health; and (3) the CIA experimented upon 
the plaintiffs (or Gul Rahman) while acting under color of law.325 They 
defined experiment as “an action taken with the primary purpose of learning 
about the medical or scientific effects of that action on humans.”326 In 
support, the defendants cited the Brandt and Pfizer cases as well as 
Additional Protocol II and the Torture Victim Protection Act.327 
On August 17, 2017, only three weeks before trial, the parties settled 
the lawsuit although the terms of the financial settlement were not 
disclosed.328 While the specific provisions of the settlement are confidential, 
both sides expressed satisfaction with the outcome.329 In a carefully worded 
joint statement, Mitchell and Jessen admitted they worked to develop a 
program for the CIA “that contemplated the use of specific coercive methods 
to interrogate certain detainees.”330 They acknowledged that Gul Rahman 
suffered abuse in the CIA program and died as a result of this abuse. They 
acknowledged that Suleiman Abdullah Salim and Mohamed Ahmed Ben 
Soud “were also subjected to coercive methods in the CIA program, which 
resulted in pain and suffering for them and their families.”331 While Mitchell 
and Jessen indicated it was regrettable that the plaintiffs had suffered these 
abuses, they did not accept responsibility. With respect to the abuse suffered 
by Salim and Ben Soud, Mitchell and Jessen alleged it “occurred without 
 
 325.  Defendants’ Proposed Jury Instructions at 74, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. 
Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ). 
 326.  Id. at 74. 
 327.  Id. at 75. 
 328.  See generally Sheri Fink, Settlement Reached in C.I.A. Torture Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 
2017, at A12; Legal Settlement in Psychologists’ CIA Torture Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2017, at A22. 
 329.  Pursuant to the terms of Mitchell and Jessen’s contracts with the CIA, the U.S. government will 
indemnify them for their legal fees and settlements. A 2008 Indemnification Agreement signed by 
Mitchell and Jessen placed a $5 million cap on the amount available for indemnification. Indemnification 
Agreement Between James Mitchell, John Bruce Jessen, and Mitchell, Jessen and Associates and the U.S. 
Government (Dec. 15, 2011). By November 2011, this amount had been reduced to $3.8 million. Of 
course, Mitchell and Jessen may also have private insurance coverage to supplement this amount. See 
Fink, supra note 328, at A12. 
 330.  On Eve of Trial, Psychologists Agree to Historic Settlement in ACLU Case on Behalf of Three 
Torture Victims, AM. C.L. UNION (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/cia-torture-psychologists-
settle-lawsuit [hereinafter ACLU News Release]. 
 331.  Id. 
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their knowledge or consent and that they were not responsible for those 
actions.”332 With respect to the abuse suffered by Rahman, they alleged “that 
they were unaware of the specific abuses that ultimately caused Mr. 
Rahman’s death and are also not responsible for those actions.”333 
In separate statements, both parties highlighted the significance of the 
settlement. In their statement, the defendants emphasized that their actions 
were legal and had been taken to save lives.334 According to Jessen, “[t]his 
resolution brings closure to this unfortunate matter. Neither Dr. Mitchell nor 
I knew about, condoned, participated in, or sanctioned the unauthorized 
actions that formed the basis for this lawsuit.”335 The plaintiffs offered a 
much different perspective. According to the plaintiffs, “[w]e brought this 
case seeking accountability and to help ensure that no one else has to endure 
torture and abuse, and we feel that we have achieved our goals.”336 They 
pointed out that the lawsuit forced Mitchell and Jessen to respond and forced 
the CIA to release classified information about the program. One of the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys echoed these thoughts: “This is a historic victory for our 
clients and the rule of law . . . This outcome shows that there are 
consequences for torture and that survivors can and will hold those 
responsible for torture accountable. It is a clear warning for anyone who 
thinks they can torture with impunity.”337 He acknowledged, however, that 
the search for justice can take many years. “But Mohamed, Suleiman, and 
Obaidullah remind me of why we keep fighting for accountability against 
what can feel like insurmountable odds. Now they want to turn to healing, 
and we can get closer to finally turning the page on torture.”338 
B. Assessing the Salim Litigation 
The Salim litigation is significant for several reasons. It represents the 
first lawsuit involving the RDI Program that moved beyond the initial stages 
of litigation.339 Prior to this decision, every lawsuit filed in the United States 
 
 332.  Id. 
 333.  Id. 
 334.  Attorneys for Defendants in Salim v. Mitchell Announce Settlement, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 17, 
2017), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170817005689/en/Attorneys-Defendants-Salim-v.-
Mitchell-Announce-Settlement. 
 335.  Id. 
 336.  AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 330. 
 337.  Id. 
 338.  Id. 
 339.  See Jeffrey Davis, Uncloaking Secrecy: International Human Rights Law in Terrorism Cases, 
38 HUM. RTS. Q. 58, 63–69 (2016) (discussing cases involving the RDI Program that were dismissed 
early); Jameel Jaffer, Known Unknowns, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 470 (2013) (discussing 
dismissal of suits); Daniel Joseph Natalie, No Longer Secret: Overcoming the State Secrets Doctrine to 
Explore Meaningful Remedies for Victims of Extraordinary Rendition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1237, 
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seeking redress for actions arising out of the RDI Program was dismissed on 
jurisdictional or prudential grounds. In contrast, the Salim plaintiffs 
overcame two motions to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. 
Despite the defendants’ repeated efforts, the district court declined to dismiss 
the case under the political question doctrine. It declined to offer the 
defendants immunity for their actions. And the court held the plaintiffs had 
raised actionable claims under the ATS. With respect to non-consensual 
human experimentation, the court declined to accept Mitchell and Jessen’s 
claims that the norm did not exist or that it failed to meet the standards for 
ATS liability. 
The Salim litigation is significant because it forced the architects of the 
RDI Program to answer the plaintiffs’ claims through responsive pleadings 
and in depositions. In addition, several CIA officials were also forced to 
explain their roles in the RDI Program through depositions.  
The discovery process revealed extensive information about the 
development of the RDI Program and Mitchell and Jessen’s role in testing 
the theory of learned helplessness on detainees.340 Hundreds of previously 
classified documents were released through the discovery process, thereby 
removing the secrecy that had previously cloaked the RDI Program. 
• Jessen and Mitchell entered a series of contracts with the CIA, 
which needed “psychologists who are trained in and 
experienced in conducting psychological assessments and 
applied research in high-risk operational settings to provide 
consultation and training in the area of operational 
assessment.”341 The project objectives included: 
Provide the [redacted] with research and consultation in 
support of [redacted] applied research efforts in the area of 
operational psychology. 
Provide the [redacted] with recommendations and suggested 
courses of action for applying research methodology to meet 
mission goals and objectives in conducting psychological 
 
1238–39 (2012) (discussing RDI cases dismissed on state secrets grounds); Ashley Scott, The State 
Secrets Privilege: Alternative Remedies in Cases of Torture Abroad, 45 SW. L. REV. 219, 219–24 (2015) 
(same); Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 625, 626 
(2010) (same); Developments in the Law – Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1160 (2009) 
(same). 
 340.  See generally Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Their Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-
0286-JLQ) (laying out the RDI program intended to develop learned helplessness in detainees). But see 
Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. 
Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ) (disputing or objecting to facts regarding the 
RDI program). 
 341.  Exhibit 1 to Notice of Filing of Defendants’ Contracts and Nondisclosure Agreements at 49, 
Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ). 
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assessment in high-risk operational settings. 
Conduct specified, time-limited research projects identified by 
the [redacted] in support of operational psychology.342 
• Before commencing the use of enhanced interrogation 
techniques on Abu Zubaydah, the interrogation team 
“suggested several environmental modifications to create an 
atmosphere that enhances the strategic interrogation process of 
[Abu Zubaydah]. The deliberate manipulation of the environment 
is intended to cause psychological disorientation, and reduced 
psychological wherewithal for the interrogation. The deliberate 
establishment of psychological dependence upon the interrogator 
as well as an increased sense of learned helplessness.”343 
• The theory of learned helplessness was the primary driver of 
the interrogation program. “The physical environment, 
[redacted] psychological state and the actual interrogation process 
are intentionally designed to develop three basic psychological 
conditions to enhance cooperation and willingness to discuss vital 
intelligence. The development of psychological dependence, 
learned helplessness and short term thinking are key factors in 
reducing [redacted] sense of hope that his well-honed counter-
measure interrogation skills will help him from disclosing 
important intelligence.”344 
• The interrogation team sought to induce complete 
helplessness, compliance and cooperation from Zubaydah. 
“Our goal was to reach the stage where we have broken any will or 
ability of subject to resist or deny providing us information 
(intelligence) to which he had access. We additionally sought to 
bring subject to the point that we confidently assess that he does 
not/not possess undisclosed threat information, or intelligence that 
could prevent a terrorist event.”345 
• Once the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu 
Zubaydah had ended, the interrogation team recommended 
that these techniques should be used on other detainees. “The 
aggressive phase at [redacted] should be used as a template for 
future interrogation of high value captives. Psychologists familiar 
with interrogation, exploitation and resistance to interrogation 
 
 342.  Id. 
 343.  Cable from [redacted] to [redacted], Subject: Eyes Only – Behavioral Interrogation Team Site 
Report (Apr. 7, 2002) (on file with the American Civil Liberties Union), 
https://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/94o.pdf. 
 344.  Cable from [redacted] to [redacted], Subject: Eyes Only – Interrogation Plan 2 (Apr. 12, 2002) 
(on file at The Torture Database), https://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/50_0.pdf. 
 345.  Cable from [redacted] to Immediate ALEC Info Director [redacted], Subject: Eyes Only – 
Status of Interrogation Phase (Aug. 20, 2002) (on file with the American Civil Liberties Union), 
https://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/98o.pdf. 
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should shape compliance of high value captives prior to debriefing 
by substantive experts.”346 
• The use of psychologists was essential to the interrogation 
program. “Personnel experienced in high value captive 
interrogation (HVCI) are essential to the successful design and 
conduct of these activities. Specially trained HVCI psychologists 
with exploitation and resistance training experience, and who 
possess the skills necessary to apply those techniques, are essential 
to the success of the interrogation process and must be physically 
present in each session with a detainee. In addition, the HVCI-
qualified psychologists must provide appropriate interrogation and 
questioning training to the [redacted] subject matter and language 
experts on the teams; this training may be provided on site where 
necessary, and will be augmented throughout the process by the 
deployed HVCI-qualified psychologists.”347 
Through the discovery process, the Salim litigation created an historical 
record. Most of these documents would not have been released without the 
lawsuit. In their absence, the details of the RDI Program would have 
remained in dispute or been lost to history.348 
The Salim litigation also revealed the profound suffering experienced 
by the plaintiffs. In his declaration, Suleiman Abdullah Salim described how 
the brutal treatment he endured left lasting marks on his body and spirit. 
I still suffer the excruciating physical and mental effects of my time in the 
Darkness and the interrogators’ abusive treatment of me. My whole body 
still aches, my upper and lower back especially. I regularly suffer crippling 
flashbacks and nightmares. They’re a constant reminder of that place and 
the terrible things that were done to me there.349 
Mohamed Ben Soud offered a similar account of the agony he experienced 
as a CIA detainee. And he described his continuing confusion as to why he 
was forced to suffer. 
I do not know why the CIA detained and interrogated me. I have never 
been involved in terrorism. I have never been a member of Al Qaeda, nor 
associated with that organization. I opposed and fought against the 
 
 346.  Id. 
 347.  Cable from [redacted] to [redacted], Subject: Eyes Only – Lessons for the Future, at 3 (Jan. 8, 
2003) (on file with the American Civil Liberties Union), https://www.thetorturedatabase.org/ 
files/foia_subsite/9_0.pdf. 
 348.  The human rights movement has long recognized the significance of truth and transparency in 
promoting healing, reconciliation, and justice. See generally William J. Aceves, The Civil Redress and 
Historical Memory Act of 2029: A Legislative Proposal, 51 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 163, 208–09 (2017) 
(discussing the right to truth in international law).   
 349.  Declaration of Suleiman Abdullah Salim at 9, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. 
Wash. 2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ).   
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Gaddafi dictatorship, but I have never taken up arms against the United 
States.350 
Finally, the settlement in Salim v. Mitchell revealed the importance of 
pursuing accountability for human rights abuses. Civil litigation allows 
victims to lead the search for justice and achieve redress, which can offer 
them closure and an opportunity for a new life.351 In Salim, the plaintiffs 
acknowledged the personal significance of the litigation and their 
satisfaction with the outcome. “We were able to tell the world about horrific 
torture, the CIA had to release secret records, and the psychologists and high-
level CIA officials were forced to answer our lawyers’ questions. It has been 
a long, difficult road, but we are very pleased with the results.”352 In Salim, 
the plaintiffs also received an undisclosed financial settlement from the 
defendants. While compensation is seldom the reason for human rights 
litigation, it can offer victims financial relief and allow them to start a new 
life. As noted by their attorneys when the settlement was announced, the 
plaintiffs could now move forward and begin to heal: “[a]ccountability is a 
process. Recovery is a process. Survival is a process. And today was a good 
day.”353 
V. INTERROGATION OR EXPERIMENTATION? 
Under the standards of international law, the CIA engaged in non-
consensual human experimentation when it tested the theory of learned 
helplessness on high-value detainees in the RDI Program.354 
First, the RDI Program consisted of systematic psychological research 
and experimentation that was meant to acquire generalizable information 
about human behavior. Mitchell and Jessen’s contracts indicated they would 
conduct research on behalf of the CIA, which included identifying scientific 
theories for influencing human behavior and modifying these theories for 
application in operational settings.355 They believed the theory of learned 
 
 350.  Declaration of Mohamed Ben Soud at 10, Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Wash. 
2016) (No. CV-15-0286-JLQ).   
 351.  See, e.g., Rupert Skilbeck, Strategic Litigation of Torture, A Victim-Centred Approach, 
REDRESS (May 9, 2018), https://redress.org/news/strategic-litigation-of-torture-a-victim-centred-
approach/. 
 352.  ACLU News Release, supra note 330, at 1–2. 
 353.  Ladin, supra note 337, at 2. 
 354.  In Salim, the plaintiffs’ proposed jury instructions identified five elements to non-consensual 
human experimentation, including danger to the subject’s health and state action. Plaintiffs’ Proposed 
Jury Instructions, supra note 321, at 50–53. As previously discussed, international law does not require 
that the research endanger the subject’s health or that the perpetrator act under color of law. Regardless, 
these two elements are clearly established in the Salim case because Mitchell and Jessen worked with the 
CIA and there was no question the plaintiffs suffered extraordinary harm.  
 355.  Statement of Work in Exhibit 1 supra note 341, at 8−10. 
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helplessness could be used to acquire actionable intelligence from detainees. 
Their working hypothesis was that enhanced interrogation techniques would 
condition the detainees to become compliant. The detainees’ degree of 
cooperation represented the primary outcome variable, and each 
interrogation technique served as a distinct independent variable. 
Following extensive research and preparation, the theory was first 
tested on Abu Zubaydah.356 It was refined in a deliberate manner with each 
interrogation and on each subsequent high-value detainee. Each 
interrogation was prepared in advance based upon the medical and 
psychological condition of the detainee. Each enhanced interrogation 
technique was meticulously applied to assess its impact on the primary 
outcome variable. Controls were implemented and maintained throughout 
interrogations to isolate the effects of the independent variables. Each 
interrogation was observed by medical professionals to ensure detainees 
were kept alive. Each interrogation was reviewed by psychologists to 
examine the validity of the theory and to ensure that results could be 
replicated. To Mitchell and Jessen, the theory was validated when detainees 
became cooperative and purportedly revealed information they had 
previously withheld from interrogators. 
The validity of the theory of learned helplessness remains disputed 
although this is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether human 
experimentation occurred. The theory itself is subject to extensive criticism 
in the medical and psychological literature.357 Its success is also unclear. 
Proponents assert that enhanced interrogation techniques conditioned 
detainees to be passive and cooperative.358 As a result, they allege the CIA 
was able to acquire actionable intelligence that prevented several terrorist 
attacks and resulted in the capture of Al-Qaeda suspects.359 Critics argue the 
theory was ill-conceived, and that little to no actionable intelligence was ever 
acquired.360 In fact, some critics argue the use of enhanced interrogation 
 
 356.  See supra Part III.B. 
 357.  See, e.g., Richard T. Liu et al., The Hopelessness Theory of Depression: A Quarter Century in 
Review, 22 CLINICAL PSYCH. 345 (2015); Charles G. Costello, A Critical Review of Seligman’s 
Laboratory Experiments on Learned Helplessness and Depression in Humans, 87 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 
21 (1978). 
 358.  See REBUTTAL: THE CIA RESPONDS TO THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE’S STUDY OF 
ITS DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM (Bill Harlow et al. eds., 2015); RODRIGUEZ, supra note 
8, at 71. 
 359.  See, e.g., J. Philip Mudd, The Craft of Intelligence and the Value of Detainee Information, in 
Harlow, supra note 358, at 25. 
 360.  SSCI II REPORT, supra note 268, at 2–3; see also Douglas A. Johnson et al., The Strategic Costs 
of Torture: How “Enhanced Interrogation” Hurt America, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2016, at 121; 
Ali Soufan, My Tortured Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A27. 
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techniques could never lead to actionable intelligence because such actions 
inevitably harm memory and affect human cognition.361 
In addition, the CIA’s failure to follow established procedures 
regarding medical and psychological experimentation is also irrelevant for 
purposes of establishing that experimentation occurred.362 These 
experiments lacked any semblance of scientific rigor. There were no control 
groups. There was no oversight by internal review boards. There were ample 
conflicts of interest, and the basic principles of scientific inquiry were 
lacking. The absence of such indicia of legitimate research, however, does 
not mean that experimentation did not occur. The historical record dating 
back to the Nuremberg trials makes clear that international law contains no 
such requirement. Moreover, imposing such a requirement would undermine 
the norm by providing a simple method for bypassing its obligations. 
Second, detainees did not offer their informed consent to participate in 
the study of learned helplessness. Certainly, their status as detainees requires 
greater scrutiny to confirm that any proffered consent was legitimate and not 
the result of fear or undue influence. But, in fact, consent was never 
requested or provided. Given the purpose of the RDI Program was to gain 
compliance from detainees who were refusing to cooperate in the 
interrogation process, this lack of consent is not surprising. Not only was 
consent lacking, but detainees made affirmative and repeated requests to 
terminate the program. Of course, their requests were rejected. 
Third, the theory of learned helplessness was not implemented for the 
betterment of the detainees. The use of enhanced interrogation techniques 
was clearly not justified by the medical or psychological conditions of the 
detainees. And, they were not carried out in the detainees’ interests. Quite 
the contrary, the enhanced interrogation techniques posed serious health 
risks to detainees and resulted in many long-term injuries and even death.363 
The interrogation logs maintained by the CIA describe the profound pain and 
suffering caused by the various interrogation techniques. The interview 
records prepared by ICRC officials after they met with several high-value 
detainees at Guantanamo reveal that detainees still experienced pain and 
suffering years after the experiments were concluded.364 
The participation of medical and psychological personnel in developing 
and implementing the theory of learned helplessness reinforces the 
 
 361.  See SHANE O’MARA, WHY TORTURE DOESN’T WORK: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF 
INTERROGATION (2015). 
 362.  But see M. Gregg Bloche, When Torture Becomes Science, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2017, at SR6. 
 363.  See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., U.S. Torture Leaves a Legacy of Detainees with Damaged Minds, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2016, at A1. 
 364.  ICRC REPORT supra note 247, at 8, 10, 30, 35. 
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conclusion that the CIA conducted non-consensual human experimentation 
on detainees. Mitchell and Jessen were licensed psychologists—
professionals trained to study human behavior and conduct applied research 
in operational psychology.365 They used their knowledge and training to 
conduct research on human beings, and yet they failed to comply with the 
most basic scientific and ethical standards of their profession. In fact, 
because of his involvement in the RDI Program, Mitchell recognized he 
would never again be able to work as a psychologist.366 But Mitchell and 
Jessen were not the only medical personnel involved in the RDI Program.  
The CIA’s Office of Medical Services was actively involved in monitoring 
and assessing the detainees throughout the detention process.367 And because 
detainees are considered vulnerable individuals, they should have been 
provided additional protections to ensure they were not subjected to any form 
of non-consensual experimentation. These standards are recognized in both 
human rights law and humanitarian law and apply regardless of whether the 
detainees were captured in times of peace or during armed conflict. 
And, while not dispositive, it is certainly relevant that the American 
Psychological Association and the American Medical Association 
repeatedly acknowledge the primacy of patient safety and well-being, 
require informed consent in research, and unequivocally condemn the role 
of medical professionals in any situations where torture or other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment may occur. In 2013, for example, the APA 
issued its Policy Related to Psychologists’ Work in National Security 
Settings and Reaffirmation of the APA Position against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.368 The policy was 
adopted in response to the RDI Program. It precludes psychologists from 
engaging in any activity, including advising, planning, designing, or 
providing training, that implicates torture or other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment.369 The policy cites numerous international instruments 
 
 365.  In seeking to establish his qualifications to provide the CIA with “special mission interrogation 
consultation,” Mitchell offered a detailed summary of his prior experiences that were “relevant for 
providing psychological consultation to interrogation programs.” Memorandum from James E. Mitchell, 
Subject: Qualifications to Provide Special Mission Interrogation Consultation (Feb. 1. 2003). This 
included providing “psychological consultation to interrogation teams,” observing “the effectiveness of 
various interrogation approaches,” and making “recommendations about how to improved [sic] the 
effectiveness of interrogation efforts.” Id. at 1.  
 366.  See MITCHELL & HARLOW, supra note 14. 
 367.  See OMS Guidelines, supra note 209, at 1. 
 368.  AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, POLICY RELATED TO PSYCHOLOGISTS’ WORK IN 
NATIONAL SECURITY SETTINGS AND REAFFIRMATION OF THE APA POSITION AGAINST TORTURE AND 
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (2013). 
 369.  Id. at 2–4. 
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with approval and relies upon them for guidance on appropriate standards.370 
Significantly, the policy identifies several examples of prohibited 
techniques, including waterboarding, slapping or shaking, stress positions, 
and sleep deprivation.371 
Arguments that purport to justify the testing of learned helplessness and 
the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on national security grounds 
find no support in international law. This argument was forcefully rejected 
at Nuremberg.372 And, it finds no support in any international instrument. 
Indeed, the ICCPR explicitly precludes derogation from the prohibition 
against non-consensual human experimentation.373 Likewise, the argument 
that the President and other high-ranking government officials authorized the 
RDI Program, thereby offering legitimacy to human experimentation, is also 
contrary to international law. This argument was also rejected at Nuremberg. 
Neither the legal advice proffered by the Office of Legal Counsel nor the 
medical support offered by the Office of Medical Services can override 
international law. In sum, no exceptions justified the enhanced interrogation 
techniques and their use in the study of human behavior.374 
Finally, the responsibility of those individuals who developed and 
implemented the RDI Program is clear.375 Under the principles first set forth 
at Nuremburg and affirmed in Geneva and Rome, these individuals are 
subject to criminal responsibility. While non-consensual human 
experimentation is a discrete crime under international law, it can also 
constitute torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. In certain 
situations, it can constitute a crime against humanity.376 In times of armed 
conflict, non-consensual human experimentation can be classified as a war 
crime.377 These norms are not mutually exclusive, and a perpetrator is subject 
 
 370.  Id. The policy cites the Convention against Torture, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 
Declaration of Helsinki, and several other international instruments. 
 371.  Id. 
 372.  See INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 222–24 (1947). 
 373.  ICCPR, supra note 107, art. 4. 
 374.  In fact, there are troubling parallels between the hypothermia experiments conducted by Nazi 
Germany and the environmental manipulation (“uncomfortably cool environments”) and water dousing 
used on detainees. OMS Guidelines, supra note 209, at 10–13. According to OMS, detainee tolerance of 
cold temperatures and susceptibility for hypothermia must “be assessed on a case by case basis, and 
continuously reevaluated over time.”  Id. at 10–11. In addition, the OMS Guidelines for exposure to water 
“were derived from submersion studies.” Id. at 13. 
 375.  See, e.g., Aceves, supra note 186, at 126–28. 
 376.  See, e.g., Military Tribunal No. 1, supra note 27, at 181; Rome Statute, supra note 83, art. 7 
(designating inhumane acts that cause great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health as a crime against humanity). 
 377.  Rome Statute, supra note 83, art. 8. 
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to criminal responsibility regardless of how the underlying crime is 
captioned. In addition, victims of non-consensual human experimentation 
are entitled to redress for their injuries, including reparations.378 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has considered whether the CIA’s RDI Program was an 
interrogation program or an example of human experimentation. In fact, it 
was both. The CIA believed the theory of learned helplessness could be used 
to acquire actionable intelligence from high-value detainees. To test the 
theory, the CIA developed several enhanced interrogation techniques that 
would be used on detainees to condition them and make them compliant. 
And with each application of the designated interrogation techniques, the 
CIA refined the program. Every hour of wall standing, every day of sleep 
deprivation, every facial slap and stress position, every application of the 
waterboard—each technique was documented, studied, and refined so it 
could be used again with greater efficacy in future interrogations. 
Medical and legal professionals—individuals who had taken an oath to 
do no harm and uphold the rule of law—participated in the program at every 
stage. Doctors used their training in human psychology to destroy the will of 
detainees, and their knowledge of human physiology to keep them alive. 
Lawyers used their understanding of the law to justify derogations from 
established normative principles and ethical standards. 
In the name of national security, the United States breached a norm that 
was long considered sacrosanct and conducted non-consensual human 
experimentation on detainees. In so doing, the United States reached its nadir 
in this conflict as the War on Terror became the war on everything. 
 
 
 378.  ICCPR, supra note 107, art. 2(3). 
